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I. INTRODUCTION 
Comparative fault ameliorates the harsh effects of the all-or-
nothing defense of contributory negligence and provides a 
mechanism for the apportionment of fault among those whose 
fault caused loss or damage to an injured plaintiff or plaintiffs.1 
One of the perplexing problems in construing comparative fault 
statutes is in determining whose fault should be considered in the 
apportionment of fault in tort litigation, and more specifically, 
whether the fault of nonparties should be considered in the 
allocation of fault, and if so, which nonparties. 
The nonparty issue inheres in any comparative negligence or 
fault statute. While the issue is sometimes directly addressed in a 
statute, often it is not. Minnesota’s comparative negligence and 
fault statutes did not directly address that question, leaving it to the 
courts to resolve the issue. 
Minnesota’s Comparative Fault Act is a modified comparative 
fault statute. A plaintiff will be barred from recovery if the 
plaintiff’s fault is greater than the fault of the person from whom 
recovery is sought.2 In general, Minnesota requires individual 
comparisons of fault.3 A plaintiff will be barred from recovery if the 
plaintiff’s fault is greater than the fault of each individual 
defendant.4 
Minnesota’s default rule is several liability. That means that 
defendants will be held liable for only their percentage of fault 
unless one of the four joint and several liability exceptions5 applies, 
 
        †   Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
 1.  1 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1:1 (3d ed. 2015).  
 2.  MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (2014). 
 3.  Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1982); Marier 
v. Mem’l Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 246, 207 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1973). 
Cambern points out that aggregate comparisons of fault will be permitted only in 
limited cases, one of which is where the defendants are involved in a joint venture. 
323 N.W.2d at 798 (citing Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 
200, 209–10, 203 N.W.2d 841, 847 (1973)). For a more detailed discussion, see 
Michael K. Steenson, The Fault with Comparative Fault: The Problem of Individual 
Comparisons in a Modified Comparative Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 
(1986). 
 4.  MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1. 
 5.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1. 
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one of which imposes joint and several liability on a defendant who 
is more than 50% at fault. 
The greater the distribution of fault, the greater the likelihood 
that any individual defendant will be held severally liable rather 
than jointly and severally liable. This means that the issue of whose 
fault is included in the allocation of fault will be critical, not only in 
determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover against any 
individual defendant, but also whether any given defendant will be 
only severally liable or jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. 
The rule of several liability became the default rule in 
Minnesota in a 2003 amendment to the Comparative Fault Act. 
Section 604.02, subdivision 1 of the Act reads in part as follows: 
“When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to 
awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable 
to each,” subject to four enumerated exceptions where joint and 
several liability continues to apply.6 
A loss reallocation statute, enacted in 1978, further provides 
that if a party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible 
after the entry of judgment, it must be reallocated among the 
remaining parties to the litigation according to their respective 
percentages of fault.7 
The problem of determining whose fault should be considered 
in the apportionment of fault has persisted from the time of the 
adoption of the comparative negligence statute in 1969, through 
the adoption of the 1978 and 2003 amendments. If anything, 
inconsistencies in the language in the amendments amplified the 
problem. The Minnesota Supreme Court had previously 
determined that the fault of certain nonparties should be 
considered in the allocation of fault, but not in cases arising after 
the 2003 amendment. The issues of whether the fault of nonparties 
should be considered in the apportionment of fault under post-
amendment section 604.02, subdivision 1 and its impact on those 
who were parties to the litigation remained unresolved until the 
supreme court’s decisions in Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud in 20128 and 
2014.9 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 2. 
 8.  Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab I), 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012). 
 9.  Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab II), 853 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 
2014). 
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The plaintiff in the case was injured at a parish school, owned 
and operated by the diocese, when her husband pushed her 
wheelchair over a five-inch drop, causing her to pitch forward and 
out of the chair.10 The plaintiff brought suit against the Diocese of 
St. Cloud.11 At trial, the fault of the diocese and the plaintiff’s 
husband was submitted to the jury, which found both to be at 
fault.12 The jury allocated 50% of the fault to the diocese and 50% 
to the husband, even though he was not a party to the litigation.13 
Staab I required the supreme court to consider for the first 
time the impact of the legislature’s 2003 amendment of Minnesota 
Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 1 of the Comparative Fault Act. 
That amendment was the culmination of years of legislative erosion 
of the rule of joint and several liability, a process that began in 1978 
and concluded in the 2003 legislative amendments, making several 
liability the default rule, subject to limited exceptions.14 
The court construed the amendment to mean that “persons     
. . . severally liable” includes nonparties,15 and held that Mr. Staab’s 
fault was appropriately considered in the apportionment of fault in 
the case,16 and that the consequence was that the other severally 
liable party, the diocese, would be held liable for only its 
percentage of fault.17 
In Staab II, decided two years later, the supreme court held 
that the loss reallocation statute in section 604.02, subdivision 2, 
which requires reallocation of the uncollectible share of a party 
(defined to include a non-party), could not be applied to increase 
the liability of a severally liable party.18 
The upshot of the Staab decisions is that where the fault of a 
nonparty is considered, it will have consequences, one of which is 
that the parties to a lawsuit will be held liable only for their 
percentages of fault, unless one of the joint and several liability 
 
 10.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 71. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  For a more detailed analysis of the changes, see Michael K. Steenson, 
Joint and Several Liability in Minnesota: The 2003 Model, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 845 
(2004). 
 15.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 76. 
 16.  Id. at 80. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 719. 
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exceptions applies, and that the loss reallocation statute cannot be 
used to increase the obligation of a severally liable party. 
Staab I and II resolved two of the issues concerning the 
allocation of fault. Others remain, however, including the 
circumstances under which the fault of nonparties will be 
considered; the rule of loss reallocation and its relationship to joint 
and several liability; the impact of the Staab decisions on products 
liability loss reallocation, which is subject to a special reallocation 
rule; and, finally, the impact of the decisions on cases involving 
third-party contribution claims against employers. 
The purpose of this article is to address these issues in depth. 
Part II is a short history of comparative negligence and fault. It 
looks at the law in distinct periods, including before and after the 
1978 amendments to the Comparative Fault Act. And, because 
Minnesota’s comparative negligence statute was based on 
Wisconsin’s, it also surveys early Wisconsin decisions dealing with 
the problem of the nonparty. Part III takes a detailed look at the 
Staab decisions. Part IV considers a variety of situations where the 
issue of the fault of a nonparty may arise. Part V examines the 
impact of the Staab decisions on joint and several liability and loss 
reallocation. Part VI considers the impact of the decisions on 
section 604.02, subdivision 3, which is the special loss reallocation 
provision that applies to products liability cases where the parties 
are in the chain of manufacture and distribution. Part VII considers 
the impact of the Staab decisions on contribution claims by third 
parties against employers. Part VIII is the conclusion. 
II. A SHORT HISTORY 
Before parsing the Staab decisions, a brief explanation of the 
source of the problems the court faced in those cases will aid in 
understanding the court’s analysis. Joint and several liability was the 
traditional rule in Minnesota.19 It survived the adoption of the 
comparative negligence statute and the amendments that turned 
that statue into a broader Comparative Fault Act.20 Those 
amendments are the source of the problem because of the 
inconsistencies that they introduced into the Act. 
The original comparative negligence statute read in part as 
follows: 
 
 19.  See Steenson, supra note 14, at 850–51. 
 20.  MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2014 & Supp. 2015); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1969). 
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Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an 
action by any person or his legal representative to recover 
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as 
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is 
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in 
the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable 
to the person recovering. The court may, and when 
requested by either party shall, direct the jury to find 
separate special verdicts determining the amount of 
damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to 
each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of 
such damages in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. When there are two 
or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to 
awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of 
negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that 
each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole 
award.21 
Minnesota’s statute was modeled after Wisconsin’s.22 The Bar 
Committee comment to section 604.01 makes it clear that 
Wisconsin law was thoroughly researched and that the Minnesota 
statute was modeled largely upon Wisconsin’s comparative 
negligence statute.23 The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken the 
position that adoption of the Wisconsin statute also included 
interpretations of that statute by Wisconsin’s highest court, up to 
the time of adoption by Minnesota.24 
The comparative negligence statute used the term “person” in 
two places in subdivision 1.25 In the first sentence, the statute states 
that contributory negligence does not bar the recovery of a 
“person” as long as that person’s fault is not equal to or greater 
 
 21.  Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069. In Maday v. Yellow 
Taxi Co., 311 N.W.2d 849, 850 (Minn. 1981), the court made it clear that joint and 
several liability was incorporated in the comparative negligence act. 
 22.  Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West, Westlaw through 2015), with 
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
 23.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 note (1969 Committee Comment) (“Supplied 
by the Minnesota State Bar Association as a portion of the interpretive 
memorandum of its Legislative Committee. . . . The Minnesota Comparative 
Negligence Statute . . . is based on Wisconsin Law.”). 
 24.  Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977); Marier 
v. Mem’l Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 244–45, 207 N.W.2d 706, 708 (1973). 
 25.  MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (1969). 
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than the negligence of the “person” from whom recovery is 
sought.26 In that context, it seems clear that “person” or “legal 
representative” has to refer to someone who is a party to the 
lawsuit. Only a “person” who is a party would be entitled to recover. 
The last sentence, the joint and several liability provision, 
stated that “[w]hen there are two or more persons who are jointly 
liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the 
percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, 
that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole 
award.”27 
Again, the use of the word “person” in that context appears to 
mean that a “person” is a party to the lawsuit. For consistency, the 
term should be interpreted similarly when it appears in the same 
subdivision. There is perhaps an ambiguity, however, because the 
second sentence uses the term party: 
The court may, and when requested by either party shall, 
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts 
determining the amount of damages and the percentage 
of negligence attributable to each party; and the court 
shall then reduce the amount of such damages in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person recovering.28 
In context, however, “party” and “person” appear to be 
interchangeable. That argument can be made based upon the text 
alone. Read that way, however, the statute has gaps that have to be 
filled. Wisconsin’s experience with its comparative negligence 
statute illustrates the problem, especially because Minnesota 
borrowed Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute in 1969. It 
also foreshadows the problems the Minnesota Supreme Court 
would have to face in interpreting its own statutes. 
A. Short Detour to Wisconsin 
Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute initially was quite 
abbreviated: 
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an 
action by any person or the person’s legal representative 
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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injury to person or property, if that negligence was not 
greater than the negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in the proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributed to the person recovering.29 
Prior to the adoption of Minnesota’s comparative negligence 
statute in 1969, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that the 
fault of certain entities had to be considered in allocating fault. 
Because of the brevity of the Wisconsin comparative negligence 
statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, out of necessity, had to plug 
the gaps in the comparative negligence statute. In 1972, in Payne v. 
Bilco Co.,30 the court read its 1962 decision in Bielski v. Schulze31 as 
adopting “the rule that the negligence of all joint tortfeasors must 
be apportioned according to their degree of negligence.”32 
The Wisconsin comparative negligence statute did not provide 
for contribution based on the percentage of negligence assigned to 
co-tortfeasors. Historically, co-tortfeasors were liable on a pro rata 
basis for purposes of contribution.33 The key issue in Bielski was 
whether contribution would continue to be determined on a pro 
rata basis or whether co-tortfeasors would be liable for their specific 
percentages of negligence.34 The court opted for a revision of the 
common law pro rata rule in favor of determining contribution 
liability based on the percentages of negligence assigned to the 
parties.35 In doing so, the court applied equitable principles, but 
used the framework of the statute and Wisconsin’s special verdict 
practice to expand the existing rule of equitable contribution to 
contribution based on percentages of fault.36 The court explained: 
If the doctrine is to do equity, there is no reason in logic 
or in natural justice why the shares of common liability of 
joint tortfeasors should not be translated into the 
 
 29.  Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 242, 1931 Wis. Sess. Laws 375, 375–76 (codified 
as amended at WIS. STAT. § 331.045 (1931)). 
 30.  195 N.W.2d 641, 645–46 (Wis. 1972). 
 31.  114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962), overruled by Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 
N.W.2d 437, 447 (Wis. 1980) (“We conclude that permitting the award of punitive 
damages in product liability cases is not inconsistent with Bielski and does not 
undermine the law of comparative negligence.”). 
 32.  Payne, 195 N.W.2d at 645–46. 
 33.  See Bielski, 114 N.W.2d at 107–08. 
 34.  See id. at 107.  
 35.  Id. at 107–08. 
 36.  Id. at 108–09. 
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percentage of the causal negligence which contributed to 
the injury. This is merely a refinement of the equitable 
principle. It is difficult to justify, either on a layman’s 
sense of justice or on natural justice, why a joint tortfeasor 
who is 5% causally negligent should only recover 50% of 
the amount he paid to the plaintiff from a co-tortfeasor 
who is 95% causally negligent, and conversely why the 
defendant who is found 5% causally negligent should be 
required to pay 50% of the loss by way of reimbursement 
to the co-tortfeasor who is 95% negligent.37 
In Pierringer v. Hoger,38 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
sanctioned piecemeal settlement of a tort claim. The court noted 
that the percentage of negligence assigned to the non-settling 
defendant “can only be determined by a proper allocation of all the 
causal negligence, if any, of all the joint tortfeasors and of the 
plaintiff if contributory negligence is involved.”39 The Pierringer 
release severs joint and several liability, and makes the non-settling 
defendants liable only for the percentage of negligence allocated to 
them.40 
Wisconsin law, at the time of the adoption of Minnesota’s 
comparative negligence statute, required consideration of the fault 
of settling defendants and, even though the comparative 
negligence statute did not provide for it, contribution according to 
the percentages of negligence assigned to co-tortfeasors. Because of 
the limited reach of the Wisconsin cases, it would be difficult to 
conclude that Wisconsin intended for the fault of nonparties, other 
than settling defendants, to be compared in the allocation of fault, 
at least at the time of the adoption of Minnesota’s comparative 
negligence statute. 
B. Return to Minnesota 
The 1978 amendment to the comparative negligence statute 
moved the joint and several liability sentence virtually verbatim to a 
new section 604.02, subdivision 1.41 The only change was the 
 
 37.  Id. at 109. 
 38.  124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963). 
 39.  Id. at 111–12. 
 40.  Peter B. Knapp, Keeping the Pierringer Promise: Fair Settlements and Fair 
Trials, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 26 (1994). 
 41.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (1978). 
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substitution of the word “fault” for “negligence.”42 The 1978 
amendment also added a new loss reallocation provision in new 
section 604.02, subdivision 2, which provides that: 
Upon motion made not later than one year after 
judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether 
all or part of a party’s equitable share of the obligation is 
uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any 
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including 
a claimant at fault, according to their respective 
percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated 
is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any 
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.43 
The loss reallocation provision, which was the first dent in the 
law of joint and several liability in Minnesota, provides for 
reallocation of a party’s equitable share of the obligation.44 The 
language was taken verbatim from section 2(d) of the Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act,45 which provided for the allocation of fault 
only to parties to the litigation, not nonparties.46 
At the time the Uniform Comparative Fault Act’s loss 
reallocation provision was adopted in Minnesota, there was nothing 
to indicate how the Minnesota courts would handle the issue of 
whether the fault of nonparties should be considered in the 
allocation of fault in tort litigation. Later, in 1978, however, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court decided Frey v. Snelgrove47 and Lines v. 
 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 2.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135 (2008).  
 46.  Id. § 2 cmt. The comment explains:  
The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other persons 
who may have been at fault with regard to the particular injury but who 
have not been joined as parties. This is a deliberate decision. It cannot 
be told with certainty whether that person was actually at fault or what 
amount of fault should be attributed to him, or whether he will ever be 
sued, or whether the statute of limitations will run on him, etc. An 
attempt to settle these matters in a suit to which he is not a party would 
not be binding on him. Both plaintiff and defendants will have 
significant incentive for joining available defendants who may be liable. 
The more parties joined whose fault contributed to the injury, the 
smaller the percentage of fault allocated to each of the other parties, 
whether plaintiff or defendant.  
Id. 
 47.  269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978). 
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Ryan.48 Both cases were decided after April 15, 1978, the effective 
date of the amendment.49 In Frey, the supreme court sanctioned the 
use of the Pierringer release50 in Minnesota and outlined the 
procedures for its use, stating as part of the procedure that the 
fault of the parties, including settling defendants, should be 
submitted to the jury: 
In almost every case the trial court should submit to the 
jury the fault of all parties, including the settling 
defendants, even though they have been dismissed from 
the lawsuit. If there is “evidence of conduct which, if 
believed by the jury, would constitute negligence (or 
fault) on the part of the person . . . inquired about,” the 
fault or negligence of that party should be submitted to 
the jury.51 
The court quoted Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee,52 
a 1975 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, in support of that 
proposition.53 The issue in Connar was whether the negligence of an 
employer should be considered in the allocation of negligence, 
even though the employer was immune from liability.54 
Lines v. Ryan,55 decided a little more than three months after 
Frey, arose out of a three-car accident in which a car driven by Jones 
was hit by a car driven by Lines.56 Lines’ car was then hit by a car 
driven by Ryan.57 Whether Lines hit Jones’ car before being hit by 
 
 48.  272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978). 
 49.  Id. at 896 (decided on November 24, 1978); Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 918 
(decided on August 18, 1978). 
 50.  For a deeper look at Pierringer releases, see Knapp, supra note 40 and 
John E. Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in 
Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977); see also supra notes 38–40 and 
accompanying text. Pierringer releases sever joint and several liability as between 
the settling defendant and nonsettling defendant(s). See Frey, 269 N.W.2d at     
922–23 (citing Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963)). The fault of the 
settling party has to be submitted to the trier of fact in part to establish the liability 
of the nonsettling defendants. Id.  
 51.  Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923 (quoting Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of 
Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975)). 
 52.  Connar, 227 N.W.2d at 662. 
 53.  Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923. 
 54.  Connar, 227 N.W.2d at 661. 
 55.  Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 896 (Minn. 1978). 
 56.  Id. at 899. 
 57.  Id. 
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Ryan’s car was in dispute.58 Because Lines was uninsured and not 
gainfully employed, Jones made a claim for uninsured motorist 
insurance benefits from her insurer, State Farm.59 Jones executed a 
release and subrogation trust agreement with State Farm upon 
receiving her insurance payment.60 
Lines brought suit against Ryan.61 State Farm subsequently 
brought suit in Jones’ name against Lines pursuant to the release 
and subrogation trust agreement.62 Ryan moved for consolidation 
of the claims.63 During the trial, “Jones moved to amend her 
complaint to add Ryan as a defendant in the Jones v. Lines action.”64 
That motion was granted.65 Ryan then “cross-claimed against Lines 
for contribution and indemnity.”66 
The jury found Jones free from negligence and assigned 60% 
of the fault to Lines and 40% to Ryan.67 Lines argued that the fault 
of Jones should not have been submitted to the jury in the Lines v. 
Ryan action.68 The supreme court followed Frey and relied again on 
Connar for the proposition that the fault of all persons contributing 
to the accident should be considered by the trier of fact in 
allocating fault.69 Connar articulated the “principle” the Minnesota 
Supreme Court found persuasive in Lines: 
It is established without doubt that, when apportioning 
negligence, a jury must have the opportunity to consider 
the negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or 
not they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they 
can be liable to the plaintiff or to the other tort-feasors 
either by operation of law or because of a prior release.70 
Connar could be read to stand for the broader proposition that 
in all cases the fault of nonparties has to be taken into 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 900. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 902.  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 902–03 (quoting Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, 227 
N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975)). 
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consideration, but at the time the case was decided the “principle” 
was confined to released parties,71 the same as in Wisconsin. Connar 
expanded the “principle” to justify consideration of the fault to the 
immune employer. 
As of Lines, then, one view is that the broadest proposition the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s cases had established is that the fault 
of nonparties should be considered where a party is released 
pursuant to a Pierringer release and where a person not joined 
contributed to a single indivisible injury. Minnesota had already 
taken the same position as Connar in Lambertson v. Cincinnati 
Welding Corp.,72 although, in Minnesota, unlike in Wisconsin, the 
employer can be made a party to a lawsuit on a third-party 
contribution claim and be held liable to the extent of its workers’ 
compensation liability or fair share of the judgment, whichever is 
less. 
The court broadened its approach to nonparties in Hosley v. 
Armstrong Cork Co.73 Hosley involved the application of the 
reallocation provision in section 604.02, subdivision 2 of the Act.74 
The issue was whether the reallocation statute applied in a case in 
which the fault of nonparties was submitted to the trier of fact.75 
 
 71.  Lines, while relying on Connar, just as easily could have relied on its prior 
decision in Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 
(1976). See generally Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 896. The minor plaintiff in that case 
suffered a serious electrical shock and burns while trimming a tree in his backyard 
under his father’s direction. Ferguson, 307 Minn. at 28–29, 239 N.W.2d at 191–92. 
The trial court separated the case into distinct comparative negligence questions, 
which asked the jury to first apportion fault between the minor plaintiff and 
Northern States Power and then to Northern States Power and the plaintiff-father. 
Id. at 31, 239 N.W.2d at 193. The jury found the minor plaintiff to be 75% at fault 
and Northern States Power 25% at fault and, in the second set of apportionment 
questions, found the plaintiff-father to be 70% at fault and Northern States Power 
30% at fault. Id. The supreme court held that it was error to submit two separate 
sets of questions apportioning fault because the fault should have been 
apportioned among all three at fault parties in a single apportionment question. 
Id. at 36, 239 N.W.2d at 196. The same rationale would presumably apply in Lines. 
See generally Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 896.  
 72.  312 Minn. 114, 119–21, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977) (describing the 
inequity arising from allowing contribution or indemnity to an employer already 
under a workers compensation system). See infra Part VII for a more detailed 
discussion. 
 73.  383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986). 
 74.  Id. at 293–94. 
 75.  Id. at 292.  
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The court held that it did not, because the equitable share of the 
nonparties’ obligation was not proved to be uncollectible.76 
Hosley sued several asbestos manufacturers.77 After 
commencement of the suit, two of the defendants filed chapter 11 
petitions for reorganization.78 The proceedings against those 
defendants were automatically stayed.79 On Hosley’s motion, the 
claims and cross-claims against those defendants were severed.80 
Hosley went to trial against the remaining defendants.81 The trial 
court submitted the fault of nine parties to the jury, including 
Hosley and Johns-Manville, two of the defendants who had filed 
under chapter 11.82 
The court held that the loss reallocation provision applied to 
Johns-Manville, the chapter 11 defendant that was severed from the 
litigation.83 The court rejected the Uniform Comparative Fault 
Act’s restrictive definition of “party” to mean a party to a lawsuit.84 
Rather, the court concluded that the definition “can be more 
broadly defined as ‘a person whose fault has been submitted to the 
jury,’ or, in other words, ‘parties to the transaction.’”85 
The court noted the comments to the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act, which explain that the reason for excluding nonparties 
to the lawsuit is because of the lack of certainty involved in 
assigning fault to them, because any findings of fault would not be 
binding on them, and because the plaintiff and defendant already 
have sufficient incentives to join them as parties. 86 But, the court 
rejected these arguments, concluding simply that Lines resolved the 
problem, even though Lines did not consider the Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act in its opinion: 
Under Lines, courts submit to the jury the fault of all 
“parties to the transaction.” Because a percentage of fault 
is assigned to such a party (Johns-Mansville in this case), 
 
 76.  Id. at 294.  
 77.  Id. at 290.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 293. 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. (quoting UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, cmt., 12 U.L.A. 39, 43 
(Supp. 1985)). 
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and because the percentage assigned represents the 
maximum amount chargeable against such a party (the 
figure can be used defensively by the party in a future 
suit), Minnesota courts can calculate the reallocation of 
this assigned fault pursuant to the statute. Thus, the 
concerns expressed in the comment to the Uniform Act 
have no applicability here.87 
Lines and Hosley establish the proposition that “person” for 
purposes of subdivision 1 of section 604.01, and “party” for 
purposes of the reallocation provision in subdivision 2 of section 
604.02, mean “parties to the transaction,” rather than parties to the 
lawsuit.88 Taken together, however, Lines, Frey, and Hosley could be 
read as having a limited reach. The cases do not declare an open 
season on submission of the fault of “parties to the transaction” if 
they are not joined in the lawsuit.89 In each of the cases, the 
“person” whose fault was submitted for apportionment was either 
joined in the lawsuit and subsequently released or severed from the 
lawsuit via settlement.90 
Those cases did not consider the joint and several liability 
provision of subdivision 1 of section 604.02, however, and what 
impact the allocation of fault to a nonparty would have on the joint 
and several liability of a party to a lawsuit. There are two Minnesota 
Supreme Court cases indicating that the Comparative Fault Act is 
simply inapplicable in cases involving in a single defendant, even if 
fault could be allocated to nonparties.91 
In Schneider v. Buckman,92 the supreme court held that the loss 
reallocation statute in section 604.02, subdivision 2 did not apply in 
a case in which there was only one defendant against whom 
 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 293; Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 903 (Minn. 1978). 
 89.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted the limitations in Ripka v. Mehus, 
390 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), in which the defendant sought to include 
a “phantom” person on the special verdict form. The court held that “a mere 
allegation by the defendant that a phantom tortfeasor contributed to the accident 
is insufficient evidence to justify submitting the alleged negligence of the phantom 
tortfeasor to the jury for apportionment.” Id. at 881. 
 90.  See Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986); Frey v. 
Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978); Lines, 272 N.W at 896. 
 91.  See Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 335 (Minn. 1990); 
Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. 1988). 
 92.  433 N.W.2d at 103. 
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judgment could be entered.93 The jury in the case had apportioned 
35% of the fault to Buckman, the owner of an ambulance service, 
for negligence in the transfer of Schneider to another hospital, 
25% of the fault to Buckman’s daughter, and 20% each to the 
transferring hospital and a physician at the hospital.94 Buckman’s 
daughter was not a party to the suit because of defective service of 
process, and the hospital and physician were not subject to liability 
because Schneider’s suit against them was time-barred.95 
The parties assumed that section 604.02, subdivision 2 
reallocation would apply, the plaintiff argued that the uncollectible 
shares of the hospital and physician should be reallocated to 
Buckman, and Buckman argued that there could be no 
reallocation because Schneider did not follow the proper 
procedures to establish reallocation.96 The supreme court held 
“that the reallocation procedures . . . as interpreted in Hosley I, are 
not implicated where, as here, there is but one defendant against 
whom judgment can be or has been entered.”97 The court held that 
the defendant was responsible for 100% of the plaintiff’s 
damages.98 
In Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal,99 a case involving a claim by the 
plaintiffs against a city-owned liquor store that served alcoholic 
beverages to an intoxicated motorcyclist who subsequently injured 
the plaintiffs when their motorcycles collided, the jury apportioned 
20% of the fault to the city and 80% to the motorcyclist.100 In a 
footnote, the supreme court questioned whether joint and several 
liability applied because the plaintiffs did not sue the motorcyclist 
whose estate was brought in as a third-party defendant by the city.101 
The court did not question the application of section 604.02, 
subdivision 1, however, because the parties proceeded on the 
assumption that subdivision 1 did apply.102 
 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. at 99. 
 95.  Id. at 100. 
 96.  Id. at 102. 
 97.  Id. at 103. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  453 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1990). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 330 n.3. 
 102.  Id. 
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In summary, the key supreme court cases construing the 
Comparative Fault Act established that the fault of certain persons 
who are not parties to a suit may be considered in the allocation of 
fault, but also hinted at the conclusion that the joint and several 
liability provisions of the Act are inoperable in cases where there is 
a single defendant who is subject to liability to the plaintiff. It was 
against this backdrop that the Minnesota Supreme Court decided 
Staab I and Staab II. 
III. THE STAAB DECISIONS 
In Staab I, the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved the issue of 
whether the fault of a nonparty could be used to effectively limit 
the liability of the sole party to a lawsuit. The court framed the 
issue as “whether the sole defendant, the Diocese of St. Cloud, 
although found by the jury to be only 50% at fault, must pay 100% 
of the $224,200.70 jury award because Staab elected not to join her 
husband as a defendant.”103 An addendum, not the court’s, might 
be, “. . . and where the Diocese chose not to join her husband.”104 
The court held that the Diocese was responsible for only its 
percentage of fault.105 The open issue, however, was whether the 
fault assigned to Mr. Staab could be reallocated to the Diocese, a 
result suggested by Justice Meyer’s dissent in the case106 and the 
position taken in two court of appeals decisions, including O’Brien 
v. Dombeck107 and Staab I itself, in the second court of appeals 
decision in the case.108 The supreme court resolved the lingering 
question, left after its first decision, in the case of Staab II by 
reversing the court of appeals and holding that the loss reallocation 
 
 103.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012). 
 104.  The issue of whether a party to a suit could join a nonparty is an 
important consideration in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of 
Liability. According to the Restatement, consideration of the fault of certain 
identified parties turns on the type of comparative fault adopted in a particular 
jurisdiction. See id. intro., §§ A9–E19. In cases where there may be joint and several 
liability, the fault of nonparties will generally not be considered, if a defendant has 
the ability to join the nonparty. The burden is not placed on the plaintiff to do so. 
See id. § A19 cmt. d (1998). 
 105.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 80. 
 106.  Id. at 85. 
 107.  823 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 108.  Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 830 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013), 
rev’d, Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 2014). 
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provision could not be applied to increase the responsibility of a 
severally liable party.109 
A. Staab I 
In Staab I, the court set out the basic rules for statutory 
construction as a first step, noting the noncontroversial proposition 
that the goal of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and 
“effectuate the intention of the legislature.”110 The court’s analysis 
is somewhat complicated, but the key points in the decision are 
that “‘several liability’ means ‘liability that is separate and 
distinct’”111 from that of another, that several liability arises at the 
time the tort is committed rather than at the time of judgment, and 
that the legislature was presumed to know these special meanings 
at the time of the 2003 amendment to the Comparative Fault Act.112 
The court’s first step was to determine whether the statutory 
language was ambiguous.113 Absent ambiguity, a court simply 
applies the plain statutory language.114 If the language is 
ambiguous, the court looks beyond the language to determine 
legislative intent, applying the relevant canons of statutory 
construction.115 
Preliminarily, the court noted that the joint and several 
liability statute is in derogation of the common law and, therefore, 
has to be strictly construed.116 That means that the court will not 
presume a legislative intent to modify the common law absent a 
clear indication by the legislature. The court swept that canon aside 
because it concluded that the clear legislative intent was to modify 
the rule of joint and several liability.117 The court’s next step was to 
“carefully examine the express wording of the statute to determine 
 
 109.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 719.  
 110.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 72 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010)). 
 111.  Id. at 73. 
 112.  Id. at 73–77. 
 113.  Id. at 72. 
 114.  Id. at 73. 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. Of course, finding an intent to modify the common law would not 
necessarily mean that the statute should not be narrowly construed in determining 
how far the rule of joint and several liability is modified. Following this conclusion, 
however, the strict construction canon was not an impediment to the court in its 
subsequent analysis. 
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the nature and extent to which the statute modifies the common 
law.”118 
In part two of its opinion, the court saw two “fundamental 
challenges” that had to be resolved in order to ascertain the 
meaning of subdivision 1 of section 604.02.119 The first was to 
determine “the point in time [when] the statute . . . appli[es] to 
determine whether ‘persons are severally liable.’”120 The second 
concerned the meaning of the terms “severally liable” and “jointly 
and severally liable.”121 
1. When Does Several Liability Arise? 
As to the first challenge, the court saw the timing of the several 
liability determination as crucial to the issue of whether a sole 
defendant is required to pay more than its equitable share of a 
judgment as measured by a jury’s apportionment of fault. This is 
the pivotal point in the court’s opinion: 
The answer to the question of when liability is determined 
for purposes of the statute directly impacts whether a sole 
defendant in a lawsuit must pay more than its equitable 
share of a judgment as measured by the percentage of 
fault apportioned to it by the jury. Thus, in order to 
interpret the statutory phrases “persons are severally 
liable” and “persons are jointly and severally liable,” we 
must examine when “persons are . . . liable” at common 
law and determine whether the statute modifies the 
common law rule.122 
The supreme court concluded that liability is created at the 
instant [a] tort is committed.123 
Under Minnesota common law, “persons are . . . liable” at 
the instant those persons’ acts cause injury to a victim. 
Applying the common law, a tortfeasor’s liability exists 
prior to and independent of any claim or civil action that 
arises from that liability; hence, a judgment on a plaintiff’s 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 74–79.  
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 73 (quoting White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 371, 137 N.W.2d 674, 
679 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 
362 (Minn. 1977)). 
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cause of action in tort in a civil action enforces that liability 
only against the defendant or defendants who are parties 
to the civil action. Moreover, the language of section 
604.02 provides no clear indication that it modifies the 
common law rule regarding the time of creation of tort 
liability. Subdivision 1 therefore cannot be read to 
indicate that “persons are . . . liable” as a result of the 
jury’s apportionment of fault because those “persons” are 
already liable at the time the tort was committed.124 
White and the cases citing it do make that statement, but all 
involved distinctly different questions than the one involved in 
Staab. White arose out of a three-vehicle collision.125 A truck driven 
by Johnson collided with a car driven by White, in which White’s 
wife was a passenger.126 The White car collided with a car driven by 
Urman.127 Three separate actions were commenced against 
Johnson, who served third-party complaints against the City of St. 
Paul alleging negligence because of the way it maintained, 
controlled, and operated the highway where the collision 
occurred.128 Johnson provided written notice of the claim to the 
City.129 He did not claim damages for injuries sustained by anyone 
other than himself.130 The plaintiffs in the three cases did not file 
notice of their claims with the City.131 
The cases were consolidated for trial.132 The City then moved 
for summary judgment on the basis that none of the plaintiffs had 
filed a notice of claim against the City, and that because the City 
could not be held liable to the plaintiffs directly, it could not be 
held liable in contribution or indemnity to Johnson.133 Putting 
aside the indemnity claim, based on its conclusion that there were 
sufficient facts to preclude summary judgment on that claim, the 
court considered whether the general rule that lack of common 
liability precludes a contribution claim applied to the case.134 
 
 124.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 73–74. 
 125.  White, 272 Minn. at 365, 137 N.W.2d at 675. 
 126.  Id. at 365, 137 N.W.2d at 676.  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id. at 366–67, 137 N.W.2d at 676–77.  
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The court distinguished the notice provision as a potential 
impediment to common liability based on the nature of that 
provision. While the statute requires a claimant to give notice to a 
municipality of a claim, it “also destroys the municipality’s 
common-law immunity from liability for negligence [claims]” 
arising out of “the maintenance of . . . [the municipality’s] streets 
and public grounds.”135 “Thus the statute concurrently creates a 
duty upon the municipality to use due care and a right against the 
municipality on the part of any person damaged because of a 
breach of that duty. We have here, then, a right and a duty pre-
existing the injury.”136 
The court went on to say that the notice requirement “is a 
condition precedent to bringing suit for the practical purpose of 
quickly informing a municipality of injuries for which it might be 
liable,”137 and that, while “[c]onceptually, the giving of notice is an 
essential element of the cause of action, . . . realistically, because of 
the preexisting right and duty, liability is created at the instant the 
tort is committed.”138 What that means is that the city is “subject to a 
liability.”139 There are other cases where subsequent limitations on 
the plaintiff’s right to sue the defendant from whom contribution is 
sought did not bar contribution claims, including cases where the 
plaintiff and defendant have entered into a covenant not to sue or 
where the plaintiff’s claim is barred by a statute of limitations.140 
The supreme court has consistently held that those subsequent 
disabilities do not extinguish the common liability required for the 
contribution claim, and the court has noted that other jurisdictions 
take the same position.141 The reason, the court in White said, “is 
that joint liability arises the moment the tort is committed and 
these defenses come into being after the conduct which creates 
that liability.”142 
 
 135.  Id. at 370, 137 N.W.2d at 679.  
 136.  Id.  
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 370–71, 137 N.W.2d at 679. 
 139.  Id. at 371, 137 N.W.2d at 679. 
 140.  See Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 364, 51 N.W.2d 108, 112 (1952) 
(statute of limitations); Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & 
Omaha Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 309, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951) (covenant not to 
sue). 
 141.  White, 272 Minn. at 371, 137 N.W.2d at 679. 
 142.  Id. 
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The court’s authority for that proposition was a 1953 note in 
the Minnesota Law Review covering contribution and indemnity 
among joint tortfeasors.143 In the course of discussing whether a 
contribution claim can be asserted when the statute of limitations 
has run in favor of one tortfeasor against the injured person, the 
note made the following statement: “Common legal liability is 
present since liability comes into existence at the instant the tort is 
committed; thereafter, the right to recover contribution remains 
inchoate until one of the tortfeasors discharges a disproportionate 
share of the financial liability.”144 The supporting authority was a 
1948 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Ainsworth v. Berg.145 
In discussing when the right of contribution arises, the court 
in Ainsworth stated: 
With respect to the equitable right to contribution arising 
in automobile cases, it clearly has its origin in the joint 
misconduct of the negligent parties at the time of the 
accident. It remains an inchoate right until such time as 
one of the joint tort-feasors pays more than his fair share 
of the total damages resulting from such joint negligence, 
at which time it ripens into a right to legal action to 
recover therefor.146 
The Ainsworth court preceded the automobile case discussion 
with an analysis of when liability of joint tortfeasors is established, 
drawn from a 1933 Wisconsin case.147 Western Casualty & Surety Co. 
v. Milwaukee General Construction Co. stated: 
Some confusion seems to exist as to when joint tort-
feasors are subject to a common liability. Logically, it 
would appear that the right comes into being when the 
combination of negligent acts gives force and direction to 
events necessarily resulting in an occasion for paying 
damages. This does not depend upon an action being 
begun. A lawsuit may be necessary to settle the differences 
arising between the parties, but it is not within the 
province of a court as an original matter to give this right 
 
 143.  Id. at 371 n.14, 137 N.W.2d at 679 n.14 (citing Note, Contribution and 
Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REV. 470 (1953)). 
 144.  Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN. 
L. REV. 470, 480–81 (1953) (citing Ainsworth v. Berg, 34 N.W.2d 790 (Wis. 1948)).  
 145.  Ainsworth, 34 N.W.2d 790. 
 146.  Id. at 793.  
 147.  Id. at 792 (citing W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 251 
N.W. 491 (Wis. 1933)). 
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or to take it away. It has its inception at the time the 
negligence of the alleged joint tort-feasors concurs to 
bring the injuries to the third person. It springs up at the 
time, and then and forever afterwards, until the claim is 
outlawed, they or either of them are under a liability to 
pay for injuries their negligent acts have caused. This 
inchoate right ripens into a cause of action when one of 
the joint tort-feasors pays more than his proportionate 
share of the claim for which all are liable.148 
The important point in all of this is that the right of 
contribution is inchoate.149 The contribution claim ripens upon 
payment by a party of more than his or her fair share of a 
judgment.150 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Spitzack v. 
Schumacher,151 which was cited by the court in Staab I,152 explains that 
“common liability” exists from the moment a tort is committed and 
that subsequent events, including the execution of a covenant not 
to sue, the running of a statute of limitations, and the failure to 
provide notice as required by a municipal tort claims act, do not 
destroy the common liability necessary to sustain the contribution 
claim: 
Even though a joint tortfeasor may subsequently 
acquire a particular defense against an injured party, that 
tortfeasor may still be held liable to a cotortfeasor for 
contribution. Thus, an injured party’s execution of a 
covenant not to sue does not destroy the common liability 
necessary to a cause of action for contribution. Similarly, 
neither an injured party’s failure to bring an action 
against a tortfeasor within the statute of limitations nor an 
injured party’s failure to provide statutory notice of a 
claim against a municipality relieves a tortfeasor of his 
liability to a joint tortfeasor for contribution. 
However, in all of these cases the defenses were 
procedural in nature and did not go to the merits of the 
case. The defenses of release, statute of limitations, and 
lack of statutory notice do not deny liability, but rather 
avoid liability. Thus, the underlying common liability was 
 
 148.  Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 251 N.W. at 492. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976). 
 152.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Minn. 2012). The court cited Spitzack for the 
proposition that “joint liability is created at the instant the tort is committed.” Id.  
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never extinguished and a joint tortfeasor’s right to 
contribution was allowed. 
The issue in the instant case is different. Respondents’ 
personal defense is not based on procedural defects which 
allowed them to escape liability. Instead, a jury found on 
the merits of the case that respondents were not as 
negligent as decedent and therefore were not liable for 
damages resulting from his death. Thus, at no time could 
plaintiffs have recovered against respondents, and thus no 
common liability could ever have existed.153 
Spitzack highlights the reason for taking the position that 
common liability arises when the tort is committed. It provides a 
rationale for refusing to allow “procedural” defenses to thwart a 
contribution claim that in fairness should not be barred by those 
defenses.154 That line of cases is simply inapposite to Staab I’s 
assertion that several liability arises from the time the tort is 
committed.155 The argument that several liability does not exist 
unless there are two or more parties to a suit is not a “procedural” 
defense.156 
While the Staab I court concluded that “persons are . . . 
liable”157 at the instant that their acts cause injury to a victim, the 
common law rule in White was interpreted by the court in Staab I to 
mean that 
a tortfeasor’s liability exists prior to and independent of 
any claim or civil action that arises from that liability; 
hence, a judgment on a plaintiff’s cause of action in tort 
in a civil action enforces that liability only against the 
defendant or defendants who are parties to the civil 
action.158 
That seems obvious. A person cannot be bound by a judgment 
in a lawsuit if the person is not a party to the litigation, but, 
nonetheless, liability exists at the moment the tort is committed.159 
 
 153.  Spitzack, 308 Minn. at 145–46, 241 N.W.2d at 643 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 154.  See id. 
 155.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 73. 
 156.  Spitzack, 308 Minn. at 145–46, 241 N.W.2d at 643. 
 157.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 74. 
 158.  Id. at 73–74. 
 159.  See id. at 75 (citing Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & 
Omaha Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 309–10, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951)). 
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The paradox is that a party is “liable” for purposes of the allocation 
of fault, but not really liable absent a judgment against it.160 
There is then a major step in the court’s reasoning that ties the 
White concept to section 604.02, subdivision 1: 
Moreover, the language of section 604.02 provides no 
clear indication that it modifies the common law rule 
regarding the time of creation of tort liability. Subdivision 
1 therefore cannot be read to indicate that “persons are    
. . . liable” as a result of the jury’s apportionment of fault 
because those “persons” are already liable at the time the 
tort was committed.161 
The reasoning of the Staab I court is wrapped tightly around 
White, which is essential to the several holdings of the court in the 
case. 
The dissenting opinion in Staab I distinguished the cases cited 
by the majority for the reasons noted in this analysis.162 The 
majority responded in a footnote: 
The dissent correctly observes that cases stating and 
applying the rule regarding the time of creation of 
common (i.e., joint and several) liability involved disputes 
over contribution between jointly and severally liable 
tortfeasors. This observation has no bearing, however, on 
the validity of the rule that such liability arises at the time 
of commission of the tort, or on our conclusion that 
section 604.02, subdivision 1, incorporates and relies 
upon that rule to determine “[w]hen two or more persons 
are severally liable.”163 
2. The Meaning of Several Liability and Joint and Several Liability 
The second fundamental challenge noted by the court was to 
determine the meaning of “several liability” and “joint and several 
liability.”164 The court found Minnesota law in Black’s Law Dictionary: 
Pursuant to Minnesota common law, “several liability” 
means “[l]iability that is separate and distinct from 
another’s liability, so that the plaintiff may bring a 
separate action against one defendant without joining the 
 
 160.  Id. at 82. 
 161.  Id. at 74. 
 162.  Id. at 80–85. 
 163.  Id. at 75 n.4. 
 164.  Id. 
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other liable parties.” Moreover, whether a person is 
“[an]other liable part[y]” for the purposes of several 
liability is a separate question from whether that person is 
joined as a defendant in a plaintiff’s lawsuit. In contrast, 
“joint liability” is “[l]iability shared by two or more 
parties.”165 
The court noted that the difference between joint and several 
liability is that defendants who are jointly and severally liable are 
responsible for the entire award, but defendants who are severally 
liable are only responsible for their equitable shares of the award.166 
Several liability has different meanings than the one noted in 
Black’s Law Dictionary, however. The sense in which the supreme 
court used the term “several liability” is consistent with section 11 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, 
establishing the effect of several liability: “When, under applicable 
law, a person is severally liable to an injured person for an 
indivisible injury, the injured person may recover only the severally 
liable person’s comparative-responsibility share of the injured 
person’s damages.”167 
The meaning of “several liability” has shifted, however, as the 
Reporters’ Note on comment (a) explains: 
Use of the term “several liability,” to describe the liability 
of defendants who are only required to pay the plaintiff 
their proportional share of the plaintiff’s damages is 
imprecise and potentially confusing. Before the advent of 
comparative responsibility, “several liability” was employed 
to describe a defendant who was responsible for all of the 
plaintiff’s damages but who could not be joined in a suit 
with any other defendant who may also have been 
responsible . . . “Several liability” was also employed when 
damages could be apportioned among concurrent 
tortfeasors based on their causal contribution to the 
plaintiff’s injury, thereby rendering each defendant 
“severally liable” for the portion of the plaintiff’s injury 
caused by that defendant.168 
The pre-comparative fault concept of several liability differs 
from the supreme court’s. Holding a severally liable party 
 
 165.  Id. at 74 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997–98 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 11 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 168.  Id. cmt. a Reporters’ note (citations omitted). 
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responsible for the entire damages award to the plaintiff was the 
usual understanding. Prosser, in the first edition of his treatise on 
torts, said: 
Quite apart from any question of vicarious liability or 
joinder of defendants, the common law developed a 
separate principle that a tortfeasor might be liable for the 
entire loss sustained by the plaintiff, even though his act 
concurred or combined with that of another wrongdoer 
to produce the result—or, as the courts have put it, that 
the defendant is liable for all consequences proximately 
caused by his wrongful act.169 
The English understanding of the concept was the same: 
Where more than one person is concerned in the 
commission of a wrong, the person wronged has his 
remedy against all or any one or more of them at his 
choice. Every wrong-doer is liable for the whole damage, 
and it does matter . . . whether the acted, as between 
themselves, as equals, or one of them as agent or servant 
of another(s).170 
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions are consistent with this 
understanding of the meaning of several liability. In Gronquist v. 
Olson, for example, the supreme court noted: “Liability in tort is 
several as well as joint, and this is so, whether the tort-feasors act 
separately or in conjunction. Each is responsible for the whole, 
although the injured person may not have more than full 
satisfaction except as punitive damages.”171 
By relying on Black’s Law Dictionary and the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, the supreme court adopted a meaning of several 
liability that deviated from its own precedent. In light of the court’s 
previous analysis, use of the term in the cases would suggest that 
the legislature would be presumptively aware of that meaning in 
 
 169.  WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1102 (1941). 
 170.  P.A. LANDON, POLLOCK’S LAW OF TORTS 109 (14th ed. 1939). 
 171.  242 Minn. 119, 126, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954) (citation omitted); see 
also Bartley v. Fritz, 205 Minn. 192, 196, 285 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1939) (“It is well 
recognized that when an injury is caused by the concurrent negligence of several, 
the negligence of each is deemed to be a proximate cause of the injury and each is 
liable for the resultant damage”); Flaherty v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 328, 329, 40 
N.W. 160, 160 (1888) (“If the collision was caused directly by the concurrent 
negligence of both companies, both are responsible.”); Heartz v. Klinkhammer, 39 
Minn. 488, 490, 40 N.W. 826, 827 (1888) (noting that joint trespassers are severally 
liable). 
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adopting the statute. That would be awkward, however, because 
prior case law was not decided in the context of a statute that used 
the familiar term, “several liability,” in a different setting. If the 
legislature was charged with understanding a general common law 
rule, that “liability” arises at the time a tort is committed, it could 
also have been charged with knowledge that the common law rule 
of several liability meant that a party would be liable for the entire 
judgment to the plaintiff. The court sidestepped the issue by 
rerouting Minnesota law through Black’s Law Dictionary.172 
In context, however, it seems clear that the legislative intent 
was to adopt the Restatement meaning of the term, even if that was 
not the settled meaning in the Minnesota cases. For the 2003 
amendment to have its desired effect, the liability of persons had to 
be limited to the persons’ percentage of fault, subject to the joint 
and several liability exceptions. 
3. Cleanup 
In the next part of its opinion the court interpreted three 
additional words and phrases in section 604.02, subdivision 1.173 
The first was “person.”174 The statute states that where “two or more 
persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in 
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each.”175 The 
issue was whether “person” means a party to the lawsuit.176 The 
court discerned no legislative intent to so limit the term, 
concluding that “a broad interpretation is consistent with the 
common law principle that several liability is examined at the time 
the tort is committed.”177 The court held that the word “persons” 
includes both parties to the lawsuit and parties to the transaction.178 
While the connection between the issue of when liability arises (at 
the time the tort is committed) and the definition of the term 
 
 172.  See Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. 2012). 
 173.  Id. at 75–77. 
 174.  Id. at 75. 
 175.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (2014). 
 176.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 73–74. 
 177.  Id. at 75 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“‘person’ as ‘[a] human being’ or ‘[a]n entity . . . that is recognized by law as 
having most of the rights and duties of a human being”); AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 1310 (4th ed. 2006) (recognizing the legal definition of “person” as 
“[a] human or organization with legal rights and duties”)). 
 178.  Id. 
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“person” is not readily apparent, the court’s opinion in Hosley,179 
which construed the term to include “parties to the transaction,”180 
justifies the result. 
Hosley interpreted the loss reallocation provision in section 
604.02, subdivision 2,181 to support its position. That section 
provides for the reallocation of a “party’s” uncollectible share of an 
obligation.182 The court in Hosley concluded that the term “party” 
includes “‘a person whose fault has been submitted to the jury,’ or, 
in other words, ‘parties to the transaction.’”183 Following Hosley, the 
court in Staab I concluded that the construction of the word 
“‘party’ in subdivision 2 means all persons who are parties to the 
tort, regardless of whether they are named in the lawsuit, it logically 
follows that ‘persons’ in subdivision 1 must also mean all parties to 
the tort.”184 
The second phrase in section 604.02 that the court construed 
was that “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the 
percentage of fault attributable to each.”185 Citing section 11 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, which 
limits the right to recover against a severally liable person to only 
the amount assigned to that person, the court construed the clause 
to make a severally liable person liable only for the percentage of 
fault assigned to that person.186 The court did not read the clause to 
mean that contribution could be required from a person not a 
party to the lawsuit because “[n]otably, the statute does not say, 
‘When two or more persons are severally liable, each shall contribute 
to the award in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to 
 
 179.  Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. 1986). 
 180.  Id. at 293. 
 181.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  383 N.W.2d at 293. Hosley was a suit against thirteen asbestos 
manufacturers of asbestos products to which Hosley was exposed during his work 
as an insulator. Id. at 290. After the suit was filed, two of the defendants in the 
case, Johns-Manville and Unarco Industries, filed petitions for reorganization 
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Id. That Act provides for an automatic stay. Id. 
Accordingly, the Hennepin County District Court stayed the proceedings against 
those two defendants. Id. Upon Hosley’s motion, the district court severed all the 
claims that had been asserted against Johns-Manville and Unarco. Id. 
 184.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 76 (Minn. 2012). 
 185.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1. 
 186.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 75–76. 
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each.’”187 Again, the distinction is not immediately apparent. Even 
had the legislature specifically stated that each severally liable 
person shall contribute to the award in proportion to his or her 
percentage of fault, it still would not obligate a nonparty to 
contribute to the award, nor could it. 
The dissent’s point was that, in order for the language to make 
sense, two parties who are liable would have to make contributions 
to awards. If there is only one party, the statute does not apply. It 
takes at least two parties to have an apportionment of liability, and 
at least two for the “contributions to awards” language to make 
sense. 
The court also rejected the argument made by the dissent that 
the clause would be ineffective if a severally liable person not a 
party to the lawsuit made no contribution. Instead, the court 
concluded that “[t]he clause would be ineffective . . . if a severally 
liable person were compelled to contribute out of proportion to his 
or her percentage of fault.”188 Of course, not being a party to a 
lawsuit, the nonparty would not be bound by the judgment. 
The third word the court construed was “liability.”189 The 
statute provides that “[w]hen two or more persons are severally 
liable,” the “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the 
percentage of fault attributable to each.”190 The word “liable” is 
problematic because it suggests that fault may be apportioned only 
to persons against whom a judgment has been rendered. The court 
rejected that argument, however, again falling back on its previous 
White analysis in which it concluded that liability exists at the time a 
tort occurs, rather than at the time of judgment.191 
Sometimes statutory construction seems to require pounding 
square pegs into round holes. That describes the process in Staab I. 
The basic issue was whether the fault of a nonparty, who could have 
been joined by either the plaintiff or the single defendant in the 
suit, should be considered in the allocation of fault and, if so, 
whether it would count in establishing the liability of the sole 
defendant to the suit.192 As a general proposition, it seems clear that 
after years of whittling away at joint and several liability, the 
 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 76. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (emphasis added). 
 191.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 76. 
 192.  Id. at 72. 
30
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss4/6
6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:25 AM 
1186 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1156 
legislature adopted several liability as the default rule, and that the 
meaning of several liability was that each party should be held 
responsible for its fair share of a judgment. 
The problem is that the statutory language seems to frustrate 
that conclusion. The statute seems to contemplate that, in order to 
make the several liability determination, the fault in a case has to 
be assigned to “two or more persons” who “are severally liable.”193 
The statute states that “contributions to awards shall be in 
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each 
[person],” absent application of one of the four exceptions where 
joint and several liability continues to apply, as in cases where a 
person is more than 50% at fault.194 
The court avoided the problem by concluding that liability 
exists independently of a tortfeasor’s participation in a lawsuit, and 
it exists independently of any obligation to contribute to a 
judgment.195 That takes care of the problem. Persons (including 
nonparties) can be severally liable absent their joinder and absent 
any judgment against them. It resolves the problem, but not 
without bending precedent to support the conclusion. 
Having dug deeply into Minnesota case law to find the answer 
of when liability arises, the court then relied on Black’s Law 
Dictionary to find the meaning of several liability, which means 
proportionate liability, rather than digging deeply into Minnesota 
case law to find the answer, which would have prompted a distinctly 
different and inconvenient conclusion on the issue. 
The main points of Staab I are: 
1. Liability does not arise at the time of judgment. Rather, 
it arises at the moment the tort is committed. That takes 
care of the issue of whether a person has to be “liable” 
for the statute to apply.196 
2. “Person” includes all parties to the transaction, so fault 
can be assigned to anyone whose fault contributed to 
the injury, even if that person is not a party to the 
litigation.197 
 
 193.  Id. at 73. 
 194.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1). 
 195.  Id. at 77. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. at 76–77. 
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3. “Liability” exists independently of a party’s participation 
in a lawsuit.198 
So, there can be several liability (or joint and several liability) 
even where the swing factor is the fault of a nonparty (who is really 
a party to the transaction that led to the lawsuit) who is liable (even 
though not a party to the suit, and even though there is no 
judgment against that nonparty). 
4. An Alternative Construction? 
After that detailed analysis, the court concluded that there is 
an alternative interpretation of the statute, which is that the issue of 
when two or more persons are severally liable is determined at the 
time of the judgment.199 That was the dissent’s basic position.200 The 
court painted the window shut on that interpretation, however, in 
stating that “[t]he predicate to this proposed interpretation is that 
the Legislature modified the common law rule that several liability 
is created at the moment the tort is committed.”201 Of course, 
starting with that proposition immediately dooms the alternative 
construction. 
The court noted the legislative intent to limit joint and several 
liability through a string of amendments, continuously limiting its 
reach. 
In order to give effect to this intent, the statute must be 
interpreted to apply in all circumstances in which a 
person would otherwise be jointly and severally liable at 
common law, and a person is liable at common law at the 
moment the tort is committed, not as a result of a 
judgment. This interpretation is consistent with the 
common law and limits the application of joint and 
several liability to those circumstances that are explicitly 
specified in the statute.202 
Even if that concept is rejected, however, there is support for 
the proposition that the fault of nonparties should be considered. 
Viewed through the prism of the long history of legislative 
amendments and judicial interpretations of the comparative 
 
 198.  Id. at 77. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 85. 
 201.  Id. at 77. 
 202.  Id. at 78. 
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negligence and fault statutes,203 the issue of whether the fault of 
nonparties should be considered in the apportionment of fault 
 
 203.  The long history of comparative fault in Minnesota has been one of 
creative judicial solutions to a series of problems that were either not directly 
addressed by the legislation or, if they were, in a way that left gaps between the 
apparent legislative intent and the path the legislature took to effectuate that 
intent. 
In two of the cases, the supreme court construed the comparative negligence 
statute to apply to claims that were not based on negligence. In Busch v. Busch 
Construction, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 395 (Minn. 1977), the supreme court applied 
the comparative negligence statute to claims for strict products liability, even 
though the comparative negligence statute at the time was limited to the 
comparison of negligence. Id. The court followed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (Wis. 1967), in which that court 
applied its comparative negligence statute to strict liability claims. Busch, 262 
N.W.2d at 393. The case was made easier because the court followed Marier v. 
Memorial Rescue Service, Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 244–45, 207 N.W.2d 706, 708 (1973) 
(requiring individual rather than aggregate comparisons of negligence), in which 
the court held that an adoption of the comparative negligence statute presumed 
adoption of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s interpretations of its comparative 
negligence statute up to that point. Id. 
Following Busch, the court in Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 733 (Minn. 
1981), applied comparative fault principles to alcohol-related claims, one based on 
a violation of the Civil Damage Act and one based on the then-permissible claim 
for negligence arising out of the sale of 3.2 beer. Jones, 309 N.W.2d at 733. Jones, 
who had been drinking at an American Legion and VFW bars, and also at a 3.2 
tavern, was struck and killed by a car driven by Kortuem and owned by Gallagher. 
Id. at 727. He was survived by his wife and two children. Id. His wife, as trustee, 
brought a wrongful death action against the owner and driver of the car. Id. That 
case settled. Id. Mrs. Jones and her two children then brought a dram shop suit 
against the two bars and a common law action against Fisher, the 3.2 beer vendor, 
an action that was at the time permitted under the supreme court’s decision in 
Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973). Id. One of the issues on 
appeal was whether Kortuem and Gallagher could assert a third-party claim for 
contribution against either the dram shop defendants or the 3.2 beer seller. Id. at 
728. The supreme court held that the contribution claim could be asserted against 
both defendants. Id. at 733. To arrive at that result, the court had to permit the 
assertion by Mrs. Jones and her two children for loss of means of support under 
the 3.2 common law action, and then justify the right of contribution against two 
defendants who were on theories other than negligence. Id. at 728. The dram 
shop and 3.2 defendants argued that there was no common liability between them 
and the wrongful death defendants, whose liability ran to Mr. Jones and not his 
spouse. Id. at 729. The court rejected the argument, concluding that “[s]ince all 
defendants are liable to decedent’s spouse either in her capacity as trustee or 
individually, the common liability requirement is satisfied.” Id. The court 
permitted allocation of fault based on comparative fault principles, even though 
the Civil Damage Act at the time did not provide for the application of 
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comparative fault principles to those claims. Id. at 731. The court recognized that 
the case arose prior to the amendment of the Civil Damage Act requiring 
allocation pursuant to the comparative negligence statute, but concluded “that it 
is appropriate to apply comparative fault concepts in the same manner as we did 
in [Busch].” Id. at 731. 
In Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989), the supreme court was 
faced with a conflict between subdivision 5 of section 604.01 of the Comparative 
Fault Act and the mandate of a Pierringer release. Id. at 20. The nonsettling 
defendant in the case wanted a pro tanto reduction of his damages by the amount 
of the settlement between the plaintiff and the defendant, which subdivision 5 
seemed to mandate, but the Pierringer release provided that the nonsettling 
defendant would be held liable for the percentage of fault assigned to him by the 
jury. Id. at 22–23. The court recognized that the acceptance of the Pierringer 
release in Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978), occurred after the 
adoption of the comparative negligence statute, but nonetheless read the statute 
to exclude Pierringer releases: 
We hold, therefore, that the term “payments” as used in [Minnesota 
Statutes section 604.01, subdivision 5], with respect to Pierringer 
settlements, refers only to payment for that portion of plaintiff’s 
damages representing the settling defendant’s share of the liability. 
The settlement payment does not extend to any further portion of 
plaintiff’s award. In this case, only O’Neill’s 10 percent share of the 
award is to be deducted from plaintiff’s award. 
Id. at 23. 
In the Lambertson v. Cincinnati Welding Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 124, 257 N.W.2d 
679, 686 (1977) line of decisions, the supreme court used the comparative 
negligence statute’s framework to solve one of the problems involved when it held 
that employers could be subject to liability on contribution claims by third parties. 
Id. While concluding that the comparative negligence and fault statutes did not 
apply directly, the court used the statutory framework for purposes of 
apportioning fault to the parties involved in the suit in order to establish the 
extent of the employer’s contribution liability. Id. In Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 
326 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Minn. 1982), the supreme court held that “a third-party 
tortfeasor may recover contribution from a negligent employer under the 
principles of Lambertson and Johnson whether or not the employee, in a direct suit, 
would have been barred from recovery under the comparative-fault statute.” Id. In 
Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Minn. 1986), the supreme court applied 
comparative fault principles in a case involving a claim for economic loss arising 
out of negligent misrepresentation, even though the statute at the time covered 
only claims for personal injury, death, or property damage. Id. The Comparative 
Fault Act was later amended to catch up to Florenzano and include claims for 
economic loss. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (Supp. 2015). 
These decisions dealt with problems that were not directly addressed in the 
comparative negligence and fault statutes. The problem of determining what 
theories of recovery are subject to comparison, what damages claims, and how 
employer liability should be treated illustrate adaptation of the statute to reach fair 
results in the face of statutory deficiencies. Of course, another reading might 
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becomes easy. The overriding goal of statutory interpretation is “to 
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”204 The 
specified factors in the basic canon suggest a holistic approach to 
statutory construction, in attempting to determine the legislative 
intent.205 
Given the fluidity of the statutory construction endeavor, there 
are different roads to follow in cases where the legislature appears 
to have a clear purpose in enacting a statute, but uses language that 
actually frustrates realization of that purpose. The court’s solution 
to the problem presented in Staab I seems to fit, but not without 
some tap-dancing around definitional problems in the statute, 
including the show-stopping use of the concept that liability arises 
when a tort is committed, rather than when one is actually found 
liable. 
The consideration of the fault of nonparties in Hosley,206 
Lines,207 and Frey208 could be used as a platform for concluding that 
 
simply be that the court ignored the statutory language to achieve an equitable 
result in those cases, and that the deficiencies should have been a matter for the 
legislature to correct.  
At base, comparative fault raises numerous issues, not all of which a 
legislature could have been expected to grasp in drafting a statute with such broad 
implications in tort litigation. If the statute is viewed as a framework to be 
judicially completed, the results may be justifiable. 
 204.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2014). 
 205.  See id. Section 645.16 reads as follows: 
The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain 
and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every law shall be 
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. 
When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation 
are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. 
When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the 
legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters: 
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; 
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted; 
(3) the mischief to be remedied; 
(4) the object to be attained; 
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or 
similar subjects; 
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; 
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and 
(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute. 
 Id. 
 206.  Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986).  
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the fault of certain identified parties should be considered in the 
allocation of fault. Imputed legislative awareness of those decisions 
could readily lead to the conclusion that it knew that the fault of 
nonparties would continue to be relevant in fault allocation, and 
that to have an accurate headcount for purposes of fault allocation 
the fault of nonparties would have to be considered, even if they 
are not actually parties to the litigation. 
Most importantly, in cases where there is ambiguity, construing 
the statute in a way that harmonizes subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 
604.02 is perhaps the strongest argument for considering the fault 
of nonparties. The second Staab decision establishes the supporting 
rationale. 
B. Staab II 
In Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab II),209 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court resolved the lingering question left after its first 
decision in the case when it held that the fault allocated to the 
nonparty could not be reallocated to the only at-fault party in the 
lawsuit. 
Section 604.02, subdivision 2 of the Comparative Fault Act 
provides for reallocation in certain cases where a share of an 
obligation is uncollectible: 
Upon motion made not later than one year after 
judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether 
all or part of a party’s equitable share of the obligation is 
uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any 
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including 
a claimant at fault, according to their respective 
percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated 
is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any 
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.210 
Any party may move for reallocation where “all or part of a 
party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible . . . .”211 
The uncollectible share must be reallocated to the remaining 
parties “according to their respective percentages of fault.”212 
 
 207.  Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978). 
 208.  Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978). 
 209.  853 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 2014). 
 210.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
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To illustrate the typical operation of the statute, assume that a 
plaintiff brings suit against two defendants (D1 and D2), that both 
defendants are found to be liable to the plaintiff, and that the 
plaintiff is found to be contributorily negligent. Assume that the 
jury apportions 20% of the fault to the plaintiff, 20% to D1, 60% to 
D2, and sets the damages at $100,000. Also assume that D1 is 
unable to pay its fair share of the judgment. D2, whose fault is 
greater than 50%, is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff and 
would be required to pay the plaintiff 80% of the plaintiff’s 
damages ($100,000, less plaintiff’s 20%). D2 would seek to 
reallocate D1’s uncollectible share of the damages ($20,000), in 
part to the plaintiff. Because D2’s equitable share of the obligation 
has to be reallocated to the plaintiff and D2 according to their 
respective percentages of fault, the plaintiff would absorb one-
fourth (20/80) of the uncollectible amount ($5,000) and D2 three-
fourths (60/80) of the uncollectible amount ($15,000). Both 
parties would have continuing contribution claims against D2. 
Staab II involved a different situation for two reasons. There 
was only one defendant who was a party to the suit.213 The plaintiff’s 
husband was not a party, but Staab I requires allocation of fault to 
parties to the transaction, so even though the husband’s chair was 
empty, fault had to be allocated to him when the jury found him to 
be causally negligent in causing his wife’s injuries.214 The second 
difference from the hypothetical is that the only defendant in the 
suit, the Diocese of St. Cloud, was found to be 50% at fault and was, 
therefore, not jointly and severally liable.215 
That means that the reallocation statute has to be read against 
section 604.02, subdivision 1, which makes several liability the 
default rule, subject to limited exceptions where a defendant or 
defendants will be jointly and severally liable. In Staab I, the 
Diocese could not be jointly and severally liable because its fault 
was not greater than 50% and none of the other exceptions 
applied.216 
As the court noted in Staab II, there are two potential 
constructions of the loss reallocation provision. One interpretation, 
reconciling the loss reallocation rule with the default rule of several 
liability, would not allow the loss reallocation rule to override the 
 
 213.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 715. 
 214.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 80. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
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default rule of several liability in subdivision 1 of section 604.02.217 
The other would, based on the text of the reallocation provision.218 
That was the subject of the disagreement between the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Staab II. The essential problem in construing 
the statute is in finding breathing room for the loss reallocation 
provision when the rule of joint and several liability is no longer the 
default rule, as it was when the loss reallocation provision was 
added to the Comparative Fault Act in 1978.219 When all defendants 
found to be at fault were jointly and severally liable, the new loss 
reallocation rule, which included any at-fault plaintiff in the 
reallocation equation if a defendant (or defendants) was unable to 
pay its fair share of the judgment, was a middle position between 
full retention of the rule of joint and several liability and a rule of 
pure several liability. 
The erosion of the rule of joint and several liability continued 
when the legislature adopted percentage cutoffs that made certain 
defendants liable for only a certain multiple of their fair shares,220 
but the statute at issue in Staab II was the 2003 amendment, which 
clearly made several liability the default rule.221 
Again, the court began its analysis of the statute with the basic 
proposition that “[t]he goal of statutory interpretation is to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature.”222 “If the Legislature’s 
intent is clear from the unambiguous language of the statute,” the 
court applies “the statute according to its plain meaning.”223 Judicial 
 
 217.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 722. 
 218.  Id. at 725–26 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
 219.  Id. at 719. 
 220.  Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, Two or More Defendants (Joint and 
Several Liability, Several Liability, or Independent Liability), in 4 MINN. PRAC. SERIES, 
CIVJIG no. 15.15 (6th ed. 2015) (“The common law rule of joint and several 
liability was modified several times by the legislature through the adoption of a 
loss reallocation rule and cutoffs limiting the liability of defendants whose fault fell 
below a certain percentage of fault.”). 
 221.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 718–19 (“The current text of subdivision 1 was 
enacted in 2003. . . . By adopting this amendment, the Legislature ‘inten[ded] to 
limit joint and several liability to the four circumstances enumerated in the 
exception clause, and to apply the rule of several liability in all other 
circumstances.’” (citing Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 78 (Minn. 2012))).  
 222.  Id. at 716. Supporting its proposition, the court first cited Brayton v. 
Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010), and then referenced Minnesota 
Statutes section 645.16. Id. 
 223.  Id. at 716–17 (citing State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013)). 
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constructions of a statute become an integral part of the statute,224 
“[b]ut if [the] statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation, the statute is ambiguous,” and the court will look to 
“other factors to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.”225 
The court determined that permitting reallocation to a 
severally liable party under section 604.02, subdivision 1 would 
violate two canons of statutory construction.226 First, it “would 
violate the principle that a statute must be construed in a manner 
that gives effect to each of its provisions.”227 Increasing the liability 
of a severally liable party via reallocation would render ineffective 
the language in section 604.01, subdivision 1, stating that 
contributions to awards should be made in proportion to the 
percentage of fault assigned to that defendant (absent a finding of 
joint and several liability under one of the statutory exceptions in 
subdivision 1).228 Second, it “would be inconsistent with [another] 
canon of statutory construction ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’—
the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”229 
Permitting reallocation would result in an interpretation of 
subdivision 2 that would in effect create a fifth exception to the 
rule of several liability.230 
The court also concluded that the legislative history of the 
2003 amendment supported its conclusion.231 The original purpose 
of the loss reallocation provision was to allow a jointly and severally 
liable party to shift part of the loss, due to the uncollectibility of a 
party who was unable to pay his or her fair share of a judgment, to 
 
 224.  Id. at 717 (“Judicial construction of a statute becomes part of the statute 
as though it were written therein.” (citing Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, 
Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012))). 
 225.  Id. (citing Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn. 
2006)). 
 226.  Id. at 718.  
 227.  Id. 
 228.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (“When two or more persons are severally 
liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault 
attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally 
liable for the whole award . . . .”). 
 229.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 718 (emphasis added). 
 230.  Id. at 719 (“The fact that one liable party is insolvent or cannot be 
collected from for other reasons is not one of the four exceptions in subdivision 1 
to which joint and several liability still applies. Yet that would be the practical 
effect of permitting reallocation to severally liable parties under subdivision 2.”).  
 231.  Id. at 718–21. 
39
Steenson: The Staab Saga: The Nonparty, Joint and Several Liability, and Lo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:25 AM 
2016] THE STAAB SAGA 1195 
other parties, including the plaintiff.232 The legislature has been 
consistent in moving toward greater restrictions of the rule of joint 
and several liability since 1978, while the loss reallocation rule has 
remained unchanged.233 The adoption of the rule of several liability 
as the default rule effectively limited the role of the loss 
reallocation provision.234 
Putting together the canons of statutory construction, the 
legislative history, and the purpose of section 604.02, subdivision 2, 
the court held “that under [section 604.02, subdivision 2], an 
uncollectible portion of a party’s equitable share of damages 
cannot be reallocated to a party that is only severally liable under 
[subdivision 1].”235 
The result is reminiscent of John Simonett’s observation that 
“everyone knows a statute does not mean what it says until a court 
says it means what it says.”236 We now know that several liability 
means several liability and that the fault of non-parties may be 
considered in the allocation of fault. The issue is whose fault 
should be included in the allocation question. 
IV. WHOSE FAULT IS APPORTIONED? 
The Minnesota cases establish that the fault of certain 
nonparties may be considered in the allocation of fault. The 
Minnesota cases are devoid of any policy analysis on the issue of 
why the fault of nonparties should be considered and under what 
circumstances. Only by implication, considering the court’s 
reference to Connar237 in Frey238 and Lines,239 is there a suggestion 
that the fault of all persons who contributed to the accident must 
 
 232.  Id. (“[W]hen subdivision 2 was enacted, it was a mechanism to limit the 
amount of damages that a jointly liable defendant could be required to pay. . . . 
[A] jointly liable defendant could petition the district court to reallocate an 
uncollectible portion of damages among all potentially liable parties, including 
the plaintiff.” (citing Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liability Minnesota Style, 
15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 969, 976 (1989))). 
 233.  Id. at 720. 
 234.  See infra Part V. 
 235.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 721. 
 236.  John E. Simonett, The Footnote as Excursion and Diversion, 55 A.B.A. J. 1141, 
1141 (1969). 
 237.  Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 
1975). 
 238.  Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978). 
 239.  Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896, 902–03 (Minn. 1978). 
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be submitted to the trier of fact in order to achieve a fair 
apportionment of fault. 
A. The Policy of Including Nonparties in the Allocation of Fault 
Whether or not to include nonparties in the allocation of fault 
is a question of fairness, but fairness is a relative and nuanced 
concept. From the plaintiff’s perspective, fairness might dictate 
apportioning fault only to parties to the suit. With Minnesota’s 
comparative fault allocation rules, the plaintiff is already at a 
disadvantage because of individual comparisons of fault, and if a 
defendant is concerned that there are other potentially responsible 
persons, the defendant can join those persons in the litigation. On 
the other hand, there may be cases where a nonparty is not subject 
to suit. That will occur in a variety of cases, including, for example, 
cases where a person or entity is immune from liability, or where a 
statute of limitations has run.240 
 
 240.  The issue of whether and under what circumstances the fault of a 
nonparty should be considered has been the subject of numerous articles. See 
generally David C. Anderson & Monika L. Sullivan, Ten Tips for Navigating 
Michigan’s Notice of Nonparty at Fault Requirements, 90 MICH. B.J. 22 (2011); William 
D. Cleaveland, The Empty Chair Game: Is the Price More Than We Should Pay?, ARIZ. 
ATT’Y, Jan. 1997, at 16; Brian P. Dunigan & Jerry J. Phillips, Comparative Fault in 
Tennessee: Where Are We Going, and Why Are We in This Handbasket?, 67 TENN. L. REV. 
765 (2000); Neal F. Eggeson, The Return of the Anonymous Nonparty: Why Hasn’t 
Anyone Noticed?, RES GESTAE, June 2006, at 11; Mark M. Hager, What’s (Not!) in a 
Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on Liability Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 77 
(2000); Nancy C. Marcusal, Phantom Parties and Other Practical Problems with the 
Attempted Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60 ARK. L. REV. 437 (2007); Joshua D. 
Shaw, Limited Joint and Several Liability Under Section 15-38-15: Application of the Rule 
and the Special Problem Posed by Nonparty Fault, 58 S.C. L. REV. 627 (2007); Mark 
Siegel & H. Michael Wright, The Nonparty at Fault Defense, the Squirrel, the Phantom 
and Everybody Else But Me, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 1992, at 23; David C. Sobelsohn, 
Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413, 445–57 (1985); Stephen B. White & David J. 
Abney, Phantom Nonparties at Fault, Problems in Apportioning Degrees of Fault, ARIZ. 
ATT’Y, June 1992, at 15; Joseph Bean, Comment, Torts—Carroll v. Whitney: The 
Tennessee Supreme Court Permits Juries to Allocate Fault to Immune Nonparties in 
Negligence Actions, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 179 (2001); Jonathan Cardi, Note, 
Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument Based on Comparative 
Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1293 
(1997); Nancy A. Costello, Note, Allocating Fault to the Empty Chair: Tort Reform or 
Deform?, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 571 (1999); Daniel Levi, Note, A Comparison of 
Comparative Negligence Statutes: Jury Allocation of Fault—Do Defendants Risk Paying for 
the Fault of Nonparty Tortfeasors?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 407 (1998). 
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The uniform acts covering comparative fault and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability take 
different positions on the issue, based on varying views of the 
underlying policies. 
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act,241 and the Uniform 
Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act242 which replaced it, 
limited the allocation of fault to parties to the lawsuit with the 
exception of settling parties. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act is 
a pure comparative fault act.243 The Uniform Apportionment of 
Tort Responsibility Act is a modified comparative fault act with 
aggregate comparisons of fault.244 A plaintiff would be barred from 
recovery only if the plaintiff’s fault is equal to or greater than the 
aggregate fault of the defendants.245 The Act imposes several 
liability with limited exceptions for joint and several liability.246 It 
also provides for reallocation of amounts uncollectible from a 
severally liable party to all other parties, including the plaintiff and 
any settling parties.247 
A preliminary draft of the Uniform Apportionment of Tort 
Responsibility Act provided for the consideration of a “nonparty at 
fault,” but that position was rejected because of the inherent 
problems involved in determining whose fault would be 
considered: 
First, who is it that should qualify as a “nonparty at fault”? 
Anyone over whom the court lacks jurisdiction? Or, does 
it matter that jurisdiction is lacking because the person is, 
for example, a foreign diplomat or an immune 
governmental or other entity, as compared to someone 
upon whom service cannot be perfected because the 
person is out of the country or whose location is 
unknown? Second, to qualify as a “nonparty at fault”, does 
the person have to be identifiable and, if so, in what 
manner or particulars? Third, it was also thought that the 
absence, and nonparticipation, of such a person tended 
to skew the trial process unfairly. Finally, it was noted that 
 
 241.  UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 142 (2008). 
 242.  UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 14 
(2008). 
 243.  UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135–36. 
 244.  UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT RESPONSIBILITY ACT § 3(b), 12 U.L.A. 14. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. § 6(a). 
 247.  Id. § 5. 
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a defendant always has the right to seek contribution from 
any legally responsible person whose fault also 
contributed to the claimant’s injury or harm and that this 
right, in most cases, will permit a defendant to join 
someone who was not already a defendant. If joinder is 
not possible, a defendant who is held responsible may 
subsequently pursue an absent tortfeasor in a separate 
action.248 
Those problems led to a limitation of the fault to only the 
parties to the litigation. A party is someone who has been sued and 
is a party to the lawsuit, not “someone who merely was involved in 
the accident that led to the lawsuit.”249 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability 
takes a different position on whose fault is subject to allocation, 
depending on the type of comparative fault involved.250 Given the 
variations in state comparative negligence and fault statutes, stating 
a single rule for the allocation of fault applicable to all of those 
variations would be difficult. Instead, the Restatement breaks down 
the standards for the allocation of fault according to comparative 
fault type.251 The Restatement includes a range of “tracks,” from 
pure joint and several liability, to joint and several liability with loss 
reallocation, to hybrid liability based on a threshold percentage of 
comparative fault, to hybrid liability based on the type of 
damages.252 No matter what type of comparative fault track is 
considered, however, there is an exception for persons engaged in 
concerted action.253 
To understand how the Restatement works, it is helpful to 
delineate the persons whose fault is potentially subject to 
consideration before pointing out how each is treated under the 
 
 248.  Id. note (2003). 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. 
(AM LAW INST. 2000).  
 251.  Id. §§ 12–15. 
 252.  Id. §§ D18 cmt. D, A18, C21, D19. 
 253.  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability section 15 
states “[w]hen persons are liable because they acted in concert, all persons are 
jointly and severally liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to 
each person engaged in concerted activity.” Id. § 15. Comment a notes that “joint 
and several liability for persons engaged in concerted action applies regardless of 
the rule regarding joint and several or several liability for independent negligent 
tortfeasors in the jurisdiction.” Id. § 15, cmt. a. 
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varied tracks. The key terms are “party,” “identified person,” 
“immune person,” and “settling tortfeasor.” 
“Party” means “those who have been joined as a party in the 
lawsuit,” including “plaintiffs, defendants, third-party defendants, 
intervenors, and other named parties.”254 An “identified person” is 
“a person who has been sufficiently identified to permit service of 
process or discovery from that person.”255 A “settling tortfeasor” is 
defined as “a potentially liable tortfeasor who is released from 
liability to the plaintiff by the settlement.”256 
“Immune persons” is a broad grouping that includes persons 
who are not liable because a statute of limitations has run, persons 
whose liability is limited because of a damages cap, and 
governmental entities who are immune from liability.257 In the 
latter case the Restatement excludes from consideration the fault 
of governmental entities where the immunity is a proxy for a no-
duty conclusion.258 
Where the rule of joint and several liability applies, only the 
fault of “parties” and “settling tortfeasors” is submitted to the trier 
of fact.259 The rationale is that the burden of identifying and suing 
other liable parties should be on those who are jointly and severally 
liable.260 The fault of other nonparties is not submitted to the 
factfinder.261 Defendants usually can join nonparties, and the 
plaintiff may sue all potentially liable persons, but the plaintiff is 
not required to do so.262 
In pure several liability jurisdictions, on the other hand, the 
Restatement rule provides for consideration of a broader grouping 
of persons in the allocation of fault, including parties, settling 
tortfeasors, and identified persons.263 The rationale is that because 
a severally liable defendant’s liability is limited to its percentage of 
fault, the burden of joining additional parties shifts to the 
plaintiff.264 
 
 254.  Id. § A19 cmt. b. 
 255.  Id. § B19 cmt. b. 
 256.  Id. § 24 cmt. c. 
 257.  Id. § B19 cmt. e. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. § A19 cmt. d. 
 260.  Id. § A19 cmt. d. 
 261.  Id.  
 262.  Id.  
 263.  Id. § B19. 
 264.  Id. § B19 cmt. d. 
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A third track covers cases where joint and several liability is 
coupled with loss reallocation. In cases where a judgment of 
contribution cannot be fully collected from another defendant, the 
uncollectible portion of the damages is reallocated to all other 
parties, including the plaintiff, in proportion to the percentages of 
fault assigned to the other parties.265 The rule requires allocation of 
fault to parties, which covers only “those who have been joined as a 
party in the lawsuit.”266 It includes “plaintiffs, defendants, third-
party defendants, intervenors, and other named parties.”267 It also 
includes settling tortfeasors and employers where the employer is 
subject to liability on a contribution claim or where the employer’s 
comparative responsibility reduces the plaintiff’s damages.268 The 
rule does not permit the assignment of fault to immune persons.269 
The rationale is that 
[o]mitting immune persons does not place the financial 
burden of the immune person’s legal responsibility 
necessarily on either plaintiffs or defendants. Comparative 
responsibility that would have been assigned to an 
immune person will necessarily (since the factfinder must 
still distribute 100 percent of responsibility) be 
apportioned among the remaining parties in the case. 
The immune nonparty’s share of comparative 
responsibility may not be assigned to (and borne by) the 
parties in the same proportion as would have occurred if 
the factfinder assigned comparative responsibility to the 
immune person and that share were then reallocated        
. . . .270 
The omission of immune persons from consideration could 
result in an increase of the plaintiff’s percentage of fault and, in a 
modified comparative fault jurisdiction, bar the plaintiff from 
recovery; however, the Restatement notes that omission of immune 
persons from consideration will not avoid that impact.271 
Yet another track applies to cases where there may be both 
joint and severally liable defendants and severally liable defendants. 
In cases where it is clear that the parties to a suit may be only jointly 
 
 265.  Id. § C21. 
 266.  Id. § C19 cmt. c. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Id. § C20. 
 269.  Id. § C19 cmt. e. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id.  
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and severally liable, the same rules apply as under the pure joint 
and several liability rule.272 Because it will not be generally known 
whether a party, or parties, will be severally liable only, the same 
rules for the treatment of immune persons apply as in the pure 
several liability cases where one or more defendants are severally 
liable.273 
Minnesota’s Comparative Fault Act274 is an amalgam of three of 
the Restatement tracks. It has a system with a default rule of several 
liability, but with limited joint and several liability exceptions, one 
of which imposes joint and several liability on a party whose fault is 
greater than 50%.275 It also has a loss reallocation provision, which 
is still viable, in addition to a special loss reallocation provision that 
applies in certain products liability cases.276 
The relevant Restatement tracks could justify differing results 
as applied to Minnesota. The default rule of several liability 
suggests consideration of nonparties, including identified persons, 
which would include certain immune persons. Even with the joint 
and several liability exception and a loss reallocation rule, the 
possibility that any party to a suit may be held only severally liable 
points as a matter of policy toward a broader inclusion of identified 
persons, beyond parties to the suit. While there is a possibility that 
parties could be jointly and severally liable, that will ordinarily not 
be determinable in advance of litigation. And, while a defendant 
may have the ability to join a nonparty, that will not be the case if 
the nonparty is immune from liability, which leads back to the basic 
position on several liability. That policy is to include identified 
persons, including certain immune persons, in the allocation of 
fault. 
That policy is disputable, of course. Several liability is intended 
to achieve fair treatment of tortfeasors,277 but it does so at the 
expense of injured persons whose chances for a full recovery are 
diminished by the consideration of the fault of multiple persons.278 
 
 272.  See id. § D19(b). 
 273.  Id. § D19(b) cmt. h. 
 274.  MINN. STAT. § 604.01. 
 275.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(1). 
 276.  Id. § 604.02, subdivs. 2–3.  
 277.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. §§ B19   
cmt. d, D19 cmt. j. 
 278.  Hager, supra note 240, at 104. Professor Hager notes Professor Wright’s 
characterization of the result as a “tortfest” in which “[t]he more defendants there 
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There is also the concern, expressed in the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act, that ensuring full litigation of tortfeasors’ fault justifies 
limiting the allocation of fault to those who are parties to the suit.279 
Minnesota’s rule as of 1978 was joint and several liability with 
loss reallocation. The Restatement track on joint and several 
liability permits consideration of the fault of only parties to the 
litigation, along with the fault of settling defendants and employers 
who are subject to liability on contribution claims.280 It would not 
permit consideration of the fault of identified persons, including 
persons immune from liability. Minnesota cases certainly suggested 
a more expansive rule than the Restatement’s, however, even 
before the 2003 amendment. In Staab I, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court carried the rule forward in considering the fault of a 
nonparty in its interpretation of the 2003 amendment. Minnesota’s 
position is consistent with the Restatement track on pure several 
liability, but at this point the Restatement position is broader 
simply because the Minnesota courts have not had occasion to 
consider some of the nonparties who are included in the 
Restatement’s apportionment of fault. 
B. Fault Allocation in Minnesota 
The Restatement tracks permitting the consideration of the 
fault of nonparties in several liability cases includes “identified 
persons,”281 which includes a variety of persons who are not parties 
to the litigation. This section breaks down in more detail the 
persons whose fault might potentially be subject to comparison 
under Minnesota law. 
Under current Minnesota law, the fault of a nonparty may be 
submitted in cases involving a party who is dismissed from litigation 
pursuant to a Pierringer release, where a party is identified and not 
joined (including the Staab facts), and where a party is dismissed 
because of bankruptcy proceedings (Hosley). There are other cases 
 
were, or the worse they behaved, the less individual responsibility each defendant 
would bear for the injury, even though her tortious behavior remained constant 
and was an actual and proximate cause of the entire injury.” Id. at 103; Richard W. 
Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 45, 
59 (1992). 
 279.  UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 125 (2008).  
 280.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19     
cmt. c. 
 281.  Id. § B19 cmt. b.  
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yet to be resolved, including where a statute of limitations has run 
on a claim against a person, where a person is not subject to 
jurisdiction in Minnesota, or where a person or entity is immune 
from liability. 
1. Parties Released Pursuant to Settlement 
In Frey v. Snelgrove,282 the supreme court followed Wisconsin law 
in holding that the fault of defendants who have entered into a 
Pierringer release should, in almost every case, be submitted to the 
jury.283 The court said that “[i]f there is ‘evidence of conduct which, 
if believed by the jury, would constitute negligence (or fault) on 
the part of the person . . . inquired about,’ the fault or negligence 
of that party should be submitted to the jury.”284 
If a Pierringer release is executed, any possibility of joint and 
several liability between the settling and nonsettling defendants is 
severed.285 The remaining parties are held liable only for their 
percentages of fault.286 Of course, the nonsettling defendants could 
be held jointly and severally liable for their combined percentages 
of fault, assuming that one of the statutory exceptions is applicable. 
2. Identified Persons 
The term “identified person” in the Restatement includes a 
variety of persons whose fault will be included in the 
apportionment of fault.287 The term is used more narrowly here to 
include persons whose identity is known, but who are not joined in 
the litigation for reasons other than that they are not subject to 
jurisdiction or are otherwise immune from liability. 
In Lines v. Ryan,288 a three-car chain collision gave rise to two 
lawsuits.289 Jones, who was driving the first car, was hit by Lines, who 
was driving the second car.290 Lines was in turn hit by a third car 
 
 282.  269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978). 
 283.  Id. at 923. The court followed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in 
Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975). 
 284.  Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923 (quoting Connar, 227 N.W.2d at 662).  
 285.  Id. at 922. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19     
cmt. b. 
 288.  Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978). 
 289.  Id. at 899. 
 290.  Id.  
48
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss4/6
6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:25 AM 
1204 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1156 
driven by Ryan, causing Lines to hit Jones a second time or, if Lines 
were believed, for the first time after Ryan hit him.291 Lines brought 
suit against Ryan.292 Because Lines was uninsured, Jones made a 
claim against State Farm, her uninsured motorist insurer, and 
settled the claim pursuant to a subrogation and trust agreement.293 
State Farm then brought suit against Lines in Jones’ name.294 The 
trial court consolidated the cases and submitted the fault of all 
three drivers to the jury, which found Lines to be 60% negligent 
and Ryan 40% negligent.295 Lines argued that Jones’ negligence 
should not have been submitted to the jury in Lines’ claim against 
Ryan.296 Again, following the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision 
in Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee,297 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly submitted the 
fault of Jones to the jury, even though Jones was not a party to the 
Lines-Ryan litigation.298 
In Ripka v. Mehus, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered 
a case involving an automobile accident in which the defendant 
claimed that the accident was due at least in part to the fault of a 
construction worker who waved her through a construction area.299 
The defendant requested that the trial court submit the fault of the 
unidentified construction worker to the jury.300 The trial court 
denied the request.301 The jury found the plaintiff 17% negligent 
and the defendant 83% negligent.302 The court of appeals held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit the 
fault of what it called a “phantom tortfeasor” to the jury.303 
The court distinguished Lines, Frey, and Connar on the facts 
because the persons whose fault was submitted in those cases were 
identified.304 The court of appeals concluded that “a mere 
 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. at 900. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. at 902. 
 297.  227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975). 
 298.  Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 902–03. 
 299.  390 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 300.  Id.  
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Id. at 881. 
 304.  Id. 
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allegation by the defendant that a phantom tortfeasor contributed 
to the accident is insufficient evidence to justify submitting the 
alleged negligence of the phantom tortfeasor to the jury for 
apportionment.”305 
The court’s approach is consistent with the position taken in 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability in 
cases where the fault of identified parties may be submitted to the 
factfinder: 
A nonparty who is not sufficiently identified to be either 
subject to service of process or discovery ordinarily should 
not be submitted to the factfinder for assignment of 
responsibility. Before assigning responsibility to 
nonparties, they should be sufficiently identified that they 
could be joined in the suit (regardless of whether 
personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction would 
exist) or that discovery could be obtained from them.306 
The Restatement takes the position that fairness may require 
an exception to the rule in some cases: 
Thus, for example, if the plaintiff attempts to mitigate her 
comparative responsibility by claiming that an 
unidentified person created an emergency that required 
the plaintiff to respond suddenly, a defendant who could 
not reasonably identify the person nevertheless should be 
permitted to have the nonparty submitted for an 
assignment of comparative responsibility.307 
3. Persons Against Whom a Statute of Limitations or Repose Has 
Run 
A person may not be subject to liability because a statute of 
limitations308 or repose309 has run on the plaintiff’s claim against 
that person. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not 
directly decided whether the fault of a person not liable to the 
plaintiff because of a statute of limitations defense should be 
 
 305.  Id. Note that other jurisdictions have specific standards for making this 
determination. 
 306.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. f 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5) (six-year statute for negligence 
claims); id. § 541.07(1) (two-year statute for certain intentional torts). 
 309.  See id. § 541.051, subdiv. 1(a) (ten-year statute of repose for 
improvements to real property). 
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submitted to the factfinder, the court’s precedent with respect to 
contribution claims indicates that it would. 
The court regards the statute of limitations as a “technical” 
defense that does not go to the merits of the case.310 “[I]t is a factor 
extrinsic to the tort itself . . . by which liability is avoided.”311 If the 
statute of limitations is not a bar to the contribution claim,312 and 
the person against whom the contribution claim has been asserted 
is a party to the litigation, that person’s fault obviously has to be 
submitted to the factfinder to determine whether there is joint and 
several liability in the first place and, if so, what the fair share is of 
the person against whom contribution is sought. 
Even if the person against whom the statute has run is not a 
party to the litigation, that person’s fault would arguably have to be 
submitted. The statute of limitations is still only a “technical” 
defense,313 and to achieve a fair apportionment of fault under the 
Minnesota rationale for including the fault of “parties to the 
transaction,” the person’s fault would have to be submitted to the 
factfinder. 
4. Persons Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction 
The Restatement position in the several liability track permits 
the inclusion of persons who are not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the allocation of fault.314 Comment (f) to section B19 
states that “[b]efore assigning responsibility to nonparties, they 
should be sufficiently identified that they could be joined in the 
suit (regardless of whether personal jurisdiction or subject-matter 
jurisdiction would exist) or that discovery could be obtained from 
them.”315 Minnesota has not yet faced this issue. If it follows the 
Restatement, Minnesota will treat persons not subject to 
 
 310.  See Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 729–30 (Minn. 1981). 
 311.  Horton v. Orbeth, 342 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Minn. 1984) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 312.  See City of Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc., 512 N.W.2d 872, 
875 (Minn. 1994) (explaining the equitable reasons for allowing contribution 
claims against a party to whom the plaintiff’s claim is barred by a statute of 
limitations). 
 313.  See Horton, 342 N.W.2d at 114. 
 314.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. f 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 315.  Id. 
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jurisdiction the same as persons against whom a statute of 
limitations has run. 
5. Persons Who Are Immune from Liability 
The Minnesota courts have not yet taken a position on the 
issue of whether the fault of persons who are immune from liability 
by operation of statute or common law should be considered in the 
apportionment of fault. The exception is Hosley, in which the 
supreme court permitted the allocation of fault to a defendant who 
was severed from the lawsuit because of the filing of a chapter 11 
petition for reorganization.316 Whether the fault of immune persons 
or entities should be considered should turn on the nature of the 
immunity. 
There are various cases in which immunities may prevent the 
imposition of liability on an individual or entity. The term 
“immunity” is used here to describe cases in which persons, 
including governmental entities, are immune from liability, either 
by statute or common law.317 The supreme court has abolished 
certain common law immunities, including interspousal tort 
immunity,318 parent-child tort immunity,319 and charitable 
immunity.320 That leaves various other immunities, both statutory 
and common law, that preclude imposition of liability in cases 
where either the legislature or the supreme court has determined 
that certain conduct is deserving of protection from civil liability. 
a. Governmental Immunities 
Governmental entities and officials are insulated from liability 
in three basic ways. The nature of the immunity will determine 
whether the fault of a governmental entity or official is subject to 
allocation under the Comparative Fault Act. 
 
 316.  Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 292–93 (Minn. 1986). 
Filing of the petition results in an automatic stay of judicial proceedings. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a)(1) (1982). 
 317.  The term has a broader meaning in the Restatement. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. e. 
 318.  See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969). 
 319.  See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980). 
 320.  See Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 398, 
175 N.W. 699, 701 (1920). 
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Government is insulated from liability by statute for damages 
or injuries caused by a variety of governmental actions,321 including 
discretionary decisions occurring at the policy level (statutory 
immunity).322 Government is also insulated from liability in cases 
where the duty owed to an injured person is a public rather than a 
private duty. Finally, government officials and their employers may 
be shielded from liability because of official and vicarious official 
immunity. 
Statutory immunity provides protection for “policy-making 
activities that are legislative or executive in nature.”323 It applies to 
planning-level decisions involving social, political, or economic 
considerations.324 It is inapplicable in cases involving operational-
level decisions involving “day-to-day operations of the government,” 
the exercise of professional judgment, or “the application of 
scientific and technical skills.”325 The purpose of statutory immunity 
is to avoid “judicial second-guessing” of the policy decisions of 
other branches of government.326 
Governmental entities are also shielded from liability by the 
judicially created public-private duty distinction.327 A governmental 
entity that assumes a special duty to certain members of the public 
may be held liable to a person injured as a result of the breach of 
duty, but not in cases where the government violates an obligation 
owed only to the general public.328 The fault of the governmental 
entity would not be submitted to the factfinder in cases involving a 
violation of a public duty by the entity.329 
 
 321.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 3.736, subdiv. 3, 466.03, subdivs. 3–6b. 
 322.  See id. at §§ 3.736, subdiv. 3(b), 466.03, subdiv. 6. 
 323.  Nusbaum v. Blue Earth Cty., 422 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 1988).  
 324.  Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 231–32 (Minn. 1988). The 
governmental entity bears the burden of establishing that its decisions are covered 
by statutory immunity. Conlin v. City of St. Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Minn. 
2000).  
 325.  Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 232–33 (internal citations omitted). 
 326.  Schroeder v. St. Louis Cty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Minn. 2006) (citing 
Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 718). 
 327.  Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. 1981); Cracraft v. City of St. 
Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979).  
 328.  Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. 1986) (citing Hage, 304 
N.W.2d at 286; Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806). 
 329.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B19 cmt. e 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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Finally, government employees and entities employing them 
may assert official immunity for claims involving the exercise of 
judgment or discretion at the operational level.330 Official immunity 
is a common law creation.331 It insulates “public official[s] charged 
by law with duties which call for the exercise of . . . judgment . . . 
from being held personally liable to an individual for damages.”332 
Generally, when official immunity applies, the governmental entity 
employing the person who committed the tort will be insulated 
from liability by vicarious official immunity.333 Official immunity is 
inapplicable where “a ministerial duty is either not performed or is 
performed negligently” or “when a willful or malicious wrong is 
committed.”334 
There are various cases in which the issue will arise as to 
whether the fault of a governmental entity or official should be 
considered in the allocation of fault. Two examples illustrate how it 
could work. First, a plaintiff might sustain injury in a motor vehicle 
accident that is the result of negligence on the part of a driver and 
a highway hazard that is the consequence of disrepair. Or, as 
another example, the plaintiff might be injured because of the 
negligence of a driver and a police officer who is pursuing the 
driver in a high speed chase. 
In the first example the issue is whether the fault of the 
governmental entity should be considered in the allocation of fault. 
If the road repair decision is a policy decision involving political, 
economic, and social factors, the claim against the governmental 
entity would be barred by statutory immunity, even if the decision 
not to repair could be deemed to be negligent. 
The dismissal because of statutory immunity is the result of a 
legislative policy decision not to subject planning-level policy 
decisions made by governmental entities to scrutiny through 
lawsuits. Where statutory liability applies there is simply no duty 
 
 330.  See MINN. STAT. § 466.03, subdiv. 6. 
 331.  See Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 1992) (quoting Susla v. 
State, 311 Minn. 166, 175, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)) (citing Elwood v. Rice 
Cty., 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988)). 
 332.  Schroeder v. St. Louis Cty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2006) (quoting 
Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677) (citing Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 
11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. 2004)). 
 333.  Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 663–64 (citations omitted). 
 334.  Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 505 (citing Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 662). 
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owed by the governmental entity to the injured person. Statutory 
immunity puts the fault issue out of reach.335 
In the second example assume that the police officer was 
negligent; the claim is barred by official immunity not because the 
police officer was not negligent, but because the police officer’s 
decision to engage in the high speed chase was discretionary.336 
Neither the police officer nor the governmental entity employing 
the officer would be liable unless the plaintiff could overcome the 
immunity. Official and vicarious official immunity differ from 
statutory immunity, however. Where statutory immunity applies the 
governmental entity owes no duty to the injured person. Official 
immunity applies to shield an at-fault official (and the employer) 
from liability for the official’s fault. 
Procedurally, if the plaintiff brings suit against the entity or 
official and the statutory immunity defense is established on 
motion for summary judgment, the governmental entity would be 
dismissed from the suit. No duty would be owing and there would 
be no basis for submitting the fault of the governmental entity to 
the trier of fact. If statutory immunity is inapplicable the entity 
would be subject to liability for the fault of the government official 
who caused the injury to the plaintiff. 
In a case involving a suit against an official and the 
governmental entity employing the official where the official 
immunity defense is asserted, the outcome would differ. If official 
(and vicarious official) immunity is asserted but overcome by the 
 
 335.  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability section D19, 
comment h, explains the difference in immunities: 
[I]mmunities sometimes may be an alternative way of stating that the 
person has no legal duty or has not breached any duty that exists. 
Thus, for example, a municipality may be “immune” from suit for 
failing to provide police protection to an individual who was assaulted. 
This “immunity” may obscure that a municipality has no duty of care in 
tort law to the general public to prevent assaults and/or that there was 
no reasonable means of precaution by which to prevent any such 
assault, such that any duty that might have existed was not breached as 
a matter of law. Identifying those immune persons who are truly 
immune despite tortious conduct that would be actionable and those 
whose immunity is an alternative way of stating that there is no duty or 
no breach of duty may be uncertain and difficult. Courts must, 
nevertheless, carefully analyze these issues in determining whether an 
immune party may be assigned a percentage of comparative 
responsibility. 
 336.  E.g., Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992). 
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plaintiff (or a defendant on a third-party claim) by establishing that 
the official engaged in willful or malicious conduct,337 the fault of 
the official would be subject to allocation by the trier of fact. A 
potential problem will arise, however, if the plaintiff is unable to 
overcome the immunity. Neither the official nor the employing 
entity could be liable, but the official could nonetheless be found 
negligent. Under those circumstances there is an argument that 
the fault of the official should be submitted to the trier of fact for 
allocation. The conduct is tortious, even if the immunity cannot be 
overcome. 
b. Other Immunities 
There are other cases where the legislature has enacted 
statutes that make certain conduct immune from liability. The 
function of the immunities is to insulate from liability conduct that 
is socially useful. There are various examples, but two will suffice. 
The Good Samaritan statute provides immunity from liability, 
even if a person engaging in a rescue effort is negligent.338 Willful 
and wanton or reckless conduct is necessary to trigger liability.339 
Another example is the immunity provided to volunteer 
athletic coaches and officials, as well as physicians and trainers.340 As 
with the Good Samaritan statute, the immunity is inapplicable in 
cases where the person asserting the immunity has acted in a willful 
and wanton or reckless manner.341 
 
 337.  See Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 505 (citing Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 662).  
 338.  MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subdiv. 2. The Good Samaritan statute reads in 
pertinent part as follows:  
A person who, without compensation or the expectation of 
compensation, renders emergency care, advice, or assistance at the 
scene of an emergency or during transit to a location where 
professional medical care can be rendered, is not liable for any civil 
damages as a result of acts or omissions by that person in rendering the 
emergency care, advice, or assistance, unless the person acts in a willful 
and wanton or reckless manner in providing the care, advice, or 
assistance. This subdivision does not apply to a person rendering 
emergency care, advice, or assistance during the course of regular 
employment, and receiving compensation or expecting to receive 
compensation for rendering the care, advice, or assistance. 
 Id. § 604A.01, subdiv. 2(a). 
 339.  Id. 
 340.  Id. § 604A.11, subdiv. 1. 
 341.  Id. § 604A.11, subdiv. 2. The list of exceptions is as follows: 
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In each case, the person who seeks the immunity would be 
subject to liability according to an ordinary negligence standard, 
absent the immunity. If the immunity applies, the plaintiff seeking 
to recover against the person asserting the immunity would have to 
prove willful and wanton or reckless misconduct in order to 
recover.342 One argument is that the fault of those persons should 
not be considered unless the plaintiff is able to establish willful and 
wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the person asserting the 
immunity. The other argument is that the immunity should be 
treated the same as official immunity in cases involving claims 
against governmental officials. Where that immunity applies, an 
official may be negligent but nonetheless immune from liability 
unless the plaintiff is able to overcome the immunity by proving 
willful or malicious conduct.343 Even assuming the official has not 
acted willfully or maliciously, however, the official may still have 
been negligent, and if so, that negligence should arguably be 
considered in any allocation of fault. 
There would be no reason to treat these statutory immunities 
any differently than the official immunity. Persons asserting the 
immunity may be negligent and their fault subject to 
apportionment even if they are not liable. It is consistent with the 
 
(1) to the extent that the acts or omissions are covered under an 
insurance policy issued to the entity for whom the coach, manager, 
official, physician, or certified athletic trainer serves; 
(2) if the individual acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in 
providing the services or assistance; 
(3) if the acts or omissions arise out of the operation, maintenance, or 
use of a motor vehicle; 
(4) to an athletic coach, manager, or official who provides services or 
assistance as part of a public or private educational institution’s athletic 
program; 
(5) to a public or private educational institution for which a physician 
or certified athletic trainer provides services; or 
(6) if the individual acts in violation of federal, state, or local law. 
Id.  
 342.  See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subdiv. 2; see also Tiedeman v. Morgan, 435 
N.W.2d 86, 86–89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (reasoning that willful and wanton or 
reckless acts would have triggered an exception to the Good Samaritan statute, but 
ultimately finding the statute inapplicable for other reasons), review denied (Minn. 
Mar. 29, 1989). 
 343.  See supra Section IV.B.5.a. 
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rationale of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and prior Minnesota 
case law, including Staab I.344 
6. Summary 
Even before the Staab decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had started down the road of permitting the fault of nonparties to 
be considered in the allocation of fault. Staab I extended the rule 
by permitting allocation of fault to a clearly identified nonparty 
who could have been joined in the litigation by either the plaintiff 
or defendant.345 Having headed down that road in Frey, Lines, and 
Hosley, there seem to be few stop signs along the way.346 The fault of 
a variety of parties may be considered in the allocation of fault, 
including the fault of settling parties, certain identified persons, 
persons against whom a statute of limitations or repose has run, 
and certain parties who are immune from liability because of 
common law or statutory immunities. There may be distinctions 
between these categories of cases, but once the supreme court 
made the decision to allocate fault to nonparties, supported by the 
policy that it is necessary to do so to achieve a fair allocation of 
fault, the distinctions seem to be without a sustainable difference. 
C. Procedural Issues 
Minnesota currently has no specific procedural requirements 
that have to be satisfied before the fault of a nonparty may be 
considered in the fault allocation question and no specific 
mechanism for challenging the inclusion of the nonparty. Other 
jurisdictions have established procedures to be followed before a 
nonparty’s fault may be considered. Michigan, for example, 
 
 344.  If the person asserting the immunity is a party to the suit, the plaintiff’s 
claim could turn on the plaintiff’s ability to satisfy the higher standard of proof 
required by official immunity or the immunity provided by other statutes. If the 
plaintiff is unable to meet the higher standard of willful, wanton, or reckless 
conduct, there would still be an issue as to whether the immune party was 
negligent. Then, if the courts take the position that the fault of immune persons 
should be considered in the allocation of fault, there would have to be a second 
special verdict question asking whether the person was negligent. A finding of 
causal negligence would be a basis for considering the fault of the immune 
person. 
 345.  See Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012). 
 346.  See supra Section II.B. 
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requires notice before the fault of a nonparty may be considered.347 
Arizona requires consideration of “the fault of all persons who 
contributed to the alleged injury, death or damage to property, 
regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named 
as a party to the suit.”348 The accompanying rule requires a party 
who seeks to include a nonparty to “provide the identity, location, 
and the facts supporting the claimed liability of such non-party        
. . . .”349 
The Restatement suggests a basic procedure for challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence to justify including a nonparty in the 
allocation of fault: 
Any nonparty that a party proposes for assignment of 
responsibility could be the subject of a ruling by the court 
on the sufficiency of the evidence to permit assignment of 
a percentage of comparative responsibility. The inquiry 
would be similar to a motion for a directed verdict or for 
judgment as a matter of law, except that the motion would 
 
 347.  MICH. CT. R. 2.112, subdiv. K(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016). The 
notice requirement reads in part as follows: 
(a) A party against whom a claim is asserted may give notice of a claim 
that a nonparty is wholly or partially at fault. A notice filed by one party 
identifying a particular nonparty serves as notice by all parties as to that 
nonparty. 
(b) The notice shall designate the nonparty and set forth the 
nonparty’s name and last known address, or the best identification of 
the nonparty that is possible, together with a brief statement of the 
basis for believing the nonparty is at fault. 
Id. 2.112, subdiv. K(3)(a)–(b). 
 348.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. 
Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.). 
 349.  ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015). The rule reads in 
full as follows: 
Any party who alleges, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2506(B), that a person 
or entity not currently or formerly named as a party was wholly or 
partially at fault in causing any personal injury, property damage or 
wrongful death for which damages are sought in the action shall 
provide the identity, location, and the facts supporting the claimed 
liability of such non-party within one hundred fifty (150) days after the 
filing of that party’s answer. The trier of fact shall not be permitted to 
allocate or apportion any percentage of fault to any non-party whose 
identity is not disclosed in accordance with the requirements of this 
subsection except upon written agreement of the parties or upon 
motion establishing good cause, reasonable diligence, and lack of 
unfair prejudice to other parties. 
Id. 
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not be made by a party seeking dismissal, but by another 
party seeking a determination that the evidence of a 
nonparty’s conduct is insufficient to permit the factfinder 
to assign responsibility to that nonparty.350 
The general principle that can be drawn from these sources is 
that the party who seeks to have the fault of a nonparty submitted 
on the allocation question should provide timely notice of the 
name and last known address of the nonparty, along with 
something like “a short and plain statement of the claim”351 that 
indicates the basis for a finding of fault on the nonparty. The 
requirements could be made part of the scheduling order.352 
The plaintiff should be able to test by pretrial motion the issue 
of whether the fault of a nonparty may be considered, either 
because the nonparty belongs to a class of persons whose fault 
should not be considered as a matter of law or, if there is no 
argument on that issue, whether there is sufficient evidence of fault 
to consider the fault of the nonparty in the allocation of fault. 
V. STAAB, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, AND LOSS REALLOCATION 
Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 2 provides that 
if “a party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from 
that party,” any uncollectible amount shall be reallocated among 
the other parties, including the plaintiff, “according to their 
respective percentages of fault.”353 After Staab II, there is an issue as 
to whether the loss reallocation provision has any life. It does, but 
before the loss reallocation statute can apply, a party to the 
litigation will have to be in a position where it is asked to pay more 
than its fair share of an obligation. This can happen only where the 
party seeking to reallocate an uncollectible amount is jointly and 
severally liable. A party who is only severally liable will never seek to 
reallocate because, by definition, that party will be responsible for 
only his or her equitable share of the obligation and no more. 
There are four situations where the rule of joint and several 
liability will apply, according to section 604.02, subdivision 1.354 The 
 
 350.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § B19 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000) (citation omitted).  
 351.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 352.  See id. 16.02. The scheduling order may include “any other matters 
appropriate in the circumstances of the case.” Id. 16.02(g).  
 353.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2 (2014). 
 354.  See id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1. There are other cases, such as vicarious liability 
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relationship between joint and several liability and loss reallocation 
will differ depending on the basis for a finding of joint and several 
liability. 
The first exception makes a party who is more than 50% at 
fault jointly and severally liable.355 The rule of joint and several 
liability will make that party liable for 100% of the plaintiff’s 
damages (assuming no fault is assigned to the plaintiff). The jointly 
and severally liable defendant who pays more than its fair share 
would have a contribution claim against any other defendant, to 
the extent of that defendant’s fault, or against a nonparty in a 
subsequent action for contribution, but the burden of establishing 
uncollectibility falls on the jointly and severally liable defendant. 
To illustrate, assume the following: 
 
Party Percentage of Fault
P 0%
D1 60%
D2 20%
NP3 20%
 
D1 and D2 are parties to the suit. NP3 is a nonparty who was 
assigned a percentage of fault. Assume damages of $100,000. 
Under the rule of joint and several liability, D1 is liable for 
100% of the plaintiff’s damages. If D2 is able to satisfy its share of 
the judgment, D1 will still be jointly and severally liable for 80% of 
the plaintiff’s damages. If D1 is obligated to pay the plaintiff those 
damages, D1 would have a contribution claim against D2 for D2’s 
share of the damages. D1 bears the burden of proving the 
uncollectibility of those damages on the contribution claim. NP3 is 
not liable on a contribution claim because NP3 is not a party to the 
suit and would not be bound either by a jury’s finding of fault or 
the percentage of fault assigned to NP3. D1 would have to establish 
the right to contribution in a separate action. Assuming, for the 
moment, that NP3 is insolvent, no part of NP3’s share of the 
obligation would be subject to reallocation. No part of NP3’s fault 
could be reallocated to D2, even if it satisfied its contribution 
obligation, because D2 is only severally liable. 
 
cases, that also would have to fit within the concept. See Steenson, supra note 14, at 
875–77. 
 355.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(1). 
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If, however, the plaintiff is at fault, reallocation is a possibility. 
To illustrate, assume the following: 
 
Party Percentage of Fault
P 20%
D1 60%
D2 20%
 
If D2 is unable to satisfy its share of the judgment, D1 would be 
jointly and severally liable to P for 80% of the damages. If D1 is 
unable to shift 20% of that loss to D2 on a contribution claim 
because of D2’s insolvency, D1 would seek to reallocate that 
uncollectible amount in part to P, pursuant to section 604.02, 
subdivision 2.356 If damages are $100,000, D2’s share, $20,000, 
would be reallocated to D1 and P according to their respective 
percentages of fault. That means that D1 would bear three-fourths 
of the uncollectible amount ($15,000) and P would bear one-
fourth of that amount ($5,000). 
If a defendant is held jointly and severally liable because of 
participation in a common scheme or plan resulting in injury to 
the plaintiff, the interaction between joint and several liability and 
loss reallocation is different.357 
To illustrate the application, assume the following: 
 
Party Percentage of Fault
P 0%
D1 60%
D2 20%
D3 20%
 
Assume damages of $100,000. Also assume that D1, D2, and D3 
are part of a common scheme or plan that resulted in injury to the 
plaintiff. If D3 is unable to satisfy its share of the obligation, the 
uncollectible amount would be reallocated to the remaining jointly 
and severally liable defendants. The Staab decisions would not 
apply to limit the liability of D2, because even though D2 is 50% or 
less at fault, D2 is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the 
full amount of the judgment because of participation in the 
 
 356.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 2. 
 357.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(2). 
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common scheme or plan. D3’s share ($20,000) would be 
reallocated between D1 and D2 according to their respective 
percentages of fault. That means that D1 would bear three-fourths 
of the uncollectible amount ($15,000) and D2 would bear one-
fourth of that amount ($5,000). D1’s total liability would be 
$75,000 and D2’s $25,000. The result would not change if D3 were 
not a party to the common scheme or plan. D2’s uncollectible 
share would still have to be reallocated between D1 and D2.358 
The result should be the same if the defendants were all held 
liable pursuant to the environmental liability statutes noted in 
section 604.02, subdivision 1.359 
There would not be a possibility of reallocation in a case 
involving a defendant who is jointly and severally liable because of 
an intentional tort. As an example, assume a case where there are 
two defendants, one liable for committing an intentional tort and 
one for negligence in failing to prevent that tort. Section 604.02, 
subdivision 1 states that “a person who commits an intentional tort” 
is jointly and severally liable for the whole award.360 
There are at least two problems with reallocation in this case. 
One is that there appears to be no basis for comparing the fault of 
a negligent defendant with a defendant who has committed an 
intentional tort.361 In order for loss reallocation to apply, a 
defendant would have to pay more than its fair share of the 
judgment, be unable to obtain contribution from a co-defendant, 
and seek to shift a proportionate share of the uncollectible amount 
to an at-fault plaintiff. None of those prerequisites can be met 
because of the lack of a statutory mechanism for the comparison of 
intentional wrongdoing with negligence. In fact, the negligent 
defendant could be held liable for the actions of the intentional 
tortfeasor.362 
 
 358.  The court indicted that this would be the result in Staab I. See Staab I, 813 
N.W.2d 68, 79 n.9 (Minn. 2012).  
 359.  See MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(4).  
 360.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 1(3). 
 361.  See id. § 604.01, subdiv. 1a. The Comparative Fault Act’s definition of 
“fault” does not include liability based on an intentional tort. Id. 
 362.  See, e.g., ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Swenson, 687 F. Supp. 2d 884, 894–96 (D. 
Minn. 2009) (acknowledging statutory ambiguity on this issue, but relying on the 
Restatement’s position that a negligent defendant may be “jointly and severally 
liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to the intentional 
tortfeasor”). 
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VI. STAAB AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
Products liability cases are subject to a special reallocation rule 
in Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 3: 
In the case of a claim arising from the manufacture, sale, 
use or consumption of a product, an amount 
uncollectible from any person in the chain of 
manufacture and distribution shall be reallocated among 
all other persons in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution but not among the claimant or others at fault 
who are not in the chain of manufacture or distribution of 
the product. Provided, however, that a person whose fault 
is less than that of a claimant is liable to the claimant only 
for that portion of the judgment which represents the 
percentage of fault attributable to the person whose fault 
is less.363 
Subdivision 3 reallocation applies only to product sellers and 
manufacturers in the chain of manufacture and distribution.364 The 
impact of this section is to treat all parties in the chain of 
manufacture and distribution as a unit. If fault is apportioned 
among two or more parties in the chain, and one is unable to pay 
its fair share, that share will be reallocated to the remaining parties 
who are in the chain. There will be no reallocation to other parties, 
including the plaintiff, presumably as long as there is at least one 
party in the chain who bears responsibility for the injury-causing 
defective product. Subdivision 3 effectively creates a rule of joint 
and several liability applicable to parties in the chain of 
manufacture and distribution.365 
Subdivision 3 uses the term “person” rather than “party.”366 
The Staab decisions construe “person” to include parties to the 
 
 363.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 3. 
 364.  Unrelated product sellers are not covered. See Tester v. Am. Standard, 
Inc., 590 N.W.2d 679, 680–81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding subdivision 3 
inapplicable to independent asbestos manufacturers). 
 365.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 3. The last sentence of subdivision 3 does 
impose a limitation on the liability of a party in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution. Id. The liability of a person who is less at fault than the plaintiffs is 
limited to that person’s percentage of fault. Id. If parties in the unit are effectively 
treated as a unit, however, it makes little sense for a party in the chain to avoid 
joint and several liability simply because fault can be split among parties in the 
chain. Given the fact that intermediaries are likely to be dismissed under 
Minnesota Statutes section 544.41, the last sentence should have limited impact. 
 366.  Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 3. 
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transaction.367 If the manufacturer is a party to a products liability 
lawsuit, the manufacturer could seek to join other intermediaries 
in the chain of manufacture and distribution, even if the plaintiff 
does not join them, or the manufacturer could simply seek to have 
the intermediaries included in the fault allocation question. The 
Staab decisions might point that way, but there are reasons why the 
fault of the intermediaries should not be included because of the 
application of Minnesota Statutes section 544.41, which entitles 
intermediaries in the chain to dismissal of strict liability claims 
against them if the manufacturer is solvent and subject to 
jurisdiction in Minnesota.368 There are two key points to be made. 
 
 367.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 2014); Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 75 
n.5 (Minn. 2012). 
 368.  MINN. STAT. § 544.41. The statute reads in full as follows: 
Subdivision 1. Product liability; requirements. In any product liability 
action based in whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or 
maintained against a defendant other than the manufacturer, that 
party shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit 
certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer of the product 
allegedly causing injury, death or damage. The commencement of a 
product liability action based in whole or part on strict liability in tort 
against a certifying defendant shall toll the applicable statute of 
limitation relative to the defendant for purposes of asserting a strict 
liability in tort cause of action. 
[Subdivision 2]. Certifying defendant; dismissal of strict liability. Once 
the plaintiff has filed a complaint against a manufacturer and the 
manufacturer has or is required to have answered or otherwise 
pleaded, the court shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort 
claim against the certifying defendant, provided the certifying 
defendant is not within the categories set forth in subdivision 3. Due 
diligence shall be exercised by the certifying defendant in providing 
the plaintiff with the correct identity of the manufacturer and due 
diligence shall be exercised by the plaintiff in filing a law suit and 
obtaining jurisdiction over the manufacturer. 
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to dismissal move to vacate 
the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying defendant, provided 
plaintiff can show one of the following: 
(1) that the applicable statute of limitation bars the assertion of a strict 
liability in tort cause of action against the manufacturer of the product 
allegedly causing the injury, death or damage; 
(2) that the identity of the manufacturer given to the plaintiff by the 
certifying defendant was incorrect. Once the correct identity of the 
manufacturer has been given by the certifying defendant the court 
shall again dismiss the certifying defendant; 
(3) that the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject to the 
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First, if the only claim against the intermediary is a strict liability 
claim, the intermediary is dismissed from the litigation. There 
would be no basis for any allocation of fault to that intermediary. It 
follows that the result should be the same if the manufacturer seeks 
to include the intermediary on the special verdict form for the 
allocation of fault if the only theory on which the intermediary 
could be liable is a strict liability theory. The section 544.41 
dismissal369 effectively precludes liability on the basis of strict 
liability. If there is no liability, there is no fault to be apportioned to 
the intermediary and there should not be a line on the special 
verdict form asking the trier of fact to apportion fault to the 
intermediary. 
Second, even if intermediaries in the chain of manufacture 
and distribution are joined, it is questionable whether fault would 
have to be split among those parties. If a product is defective, the 
intermediary is liable for selling the product,370 but the 
 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state, or, despite due diligence, the 
manufacturer is not amenable to service of process; 
(4) that the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment as 
determined by the court; or 
(5) that the court determines that the manufacturer would be unable 
to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with plaintiff. 
[Subdivision 3]. Dismissal order prohibited. A court shall not enter a 
dismissal order relative to any certifying defendant even though full 
compliance with subdivision 1 has been made where the plaintiff can 
show one of the following: 
(1) that the defendant has exercised some significant control over the 
design or manufacture of the product, or has provided instructions or 
warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in the 
product which caused the injury, death or damage; 
(2) that the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect in the 
product which caused the injury, death or damage; or 
(3) that the defendant created the defect in the product which caused 
the injury, death or damage. 
[Subdivision 4]. Limiting constructing laws. Nothing contained in 
subdivisions 1 to 3 shall be construed to create a cause of action in 
strict liability in tort or based on other legal theory, or to affect the 
right of any person to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution. 
Id. 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  See Marcon v. Kmart Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding sled retailer liable for sale of sled even though jury assigned 100% of the 
fault to the bankrupt manufacturer). The court of appeals noted that “[t]he 
practical effect of strict-liability principles is to hold a faultless seller jointly and 
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intermediary is a passive party, liable only for passing along a 
defective product in the chain of distribution. There is no basis for 
splitting fault in those cases. The intermediary is liable for selling a 
defective product, even if the intermediary had no knowledge of 
the defect and played no role in causing the defect. 
If dismissal under section 544.41 is inappropriate because the 
intermediary influenced the design of the product, had actual 
knowledge of the defect, or created the defect, there may be a basis 
for a finding of fault, in addition to the strict liability that flows, just 
from the intermediary’s sale of the product. In the first two 
situations, there would be a basis for allocating fault to the 
intermediary. In the last, where the intermediary is responsible for 
creating the defect, the intermediary could be found solely 
responsible for the defect, of course. 
Because the reallocation rule requires reallocation to other 
parties in the chain, there is no reason to think that the Staab 
decisions would apply to limit the liability of a party who is found to 
be 50% or less at fault. All persons in the chain are treated as a 
unit. If one party’s share is uncollectible, it should be reallocated to 
the remaining parties in the chain, and only if the parties in the 
chain were unable to satisfy their obligations would there be 
reallocation to other parties, including the plaintiff. 
In summary, the Staab decisions should not have an impact on 
products liability cases where apportionment of fault among parties 
in the chain of manufacture and distribution is concerned. The 
Staab decisions permit consideration of the fault of nonparties, but 
careful consideration has to be given to the circumstances where 
that will occur. The general rationale that fault of all responsible 
persons should be considered in the allocation of fault does not fit 
in subdivision 3 cases. 
 
severally liable for the causal fault of the manufacturer.” In re Shigellosis Litig., 647 
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). For that proposition, the court relied on 
Justice Simonett’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Hudson v. Snyder Body, 
Inc., in which he noted that an intermediary in the case “is liable to plaintiffs but 
only in a vicarious or derivative sense as the inert seller in the marketing chain.” 
326 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Minn. 1982). He noted that “[t]his is not the kind of 
conduct that needs to be included in a comparative fault question, and the jury 
properly ignored it.” Id. 
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VII. STAAB AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY 
There is also a question as to whether the Staab decisions apply 
in cases where a third party has a contribution against an employer. 
It is clear from Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp.371 and subsequent 
cases372 that situations involving third-party claims against an 
employer for contribution will be resolved under the comparative 
fault structure, even if the common liability requirement, which is a 
prerequisite for contribution claims, is technically missing.373 
Because prior cases374 have indicated that the comparative 
negligence statute and Comparative Fault Act are not applicable to 
those contribution claims, even though comparative fault 
principles are used to apportion fault among parties to that 
litigation, there is an issue as to whether the Staab decisions will 
apply to cap the fault of an employer found to be 50% or less at 
fault. 
The question was considered in Gaudreault v. Elite Line Services, 
LLC.375 The plaintiff, a former equipment service manager for Delta 
Airlines, was injured when a ground power cord unit that was 
hanging from a jetway fell on him as he was working under the 
jetway.376 The plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits 
from Delta and later commenced suit against Elite Line Services 
(ELS), “a company that provides operation and maintenance 
services to airports and airlines.”377 ELS had a contract with Delta 
for the inspection and maintenance of the ground equipment at 
 
 371.  312 Minn. 114, 119–20, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977). 
 372.  See, e.g., Horton v. Orbeth, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 112, 114–15 (Minn. 1984).  
 373.  Common liability is a prerequisite for contribution. See Ascheman v. Vill. 
of Hancock, 254 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. 1977) (holding that the husband who 
sustained injury leading to Civil Damage Act claim against the Village was not 
liable on a contribution claim because of lack of common liability due to the fact 
that husband had no direct liability to his wife and daughter for loss of their 
means of support); Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 147, 241 N.W.2d 641, 
643 (1976) (holding that no common liability existed where a person from whom 
contribution is sought was found not liable in a previous proceeding) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 374.  Id. 
 375.  22 F. Supp. 3d 966 (D. Minn. 2014).  
 376.  Id. at 969. A ground power cord unit can weigh over 150 pounds. Id. The 
cord can be attached to the side of the jetway with a hanger assembly that permits 
the cord to be hoisted up and down from that position by the ground crew. Id. 
 377.  Id. 
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Minneapolis Saint Paul Airport, where the plaintiff was working.378 
The plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against ELS.379 ELS filed a 
third-party complaint against Delta, “asserting a right of 
contribution.”380 
In one of its pre-trial motions, ELS asked for an order granting 
partial summary judgment finding that ELS could not be held 
jointly and severally liable unless found to be more than 50% at 
fault.381 The court viewed it as “in essence, a request for clarification 
about the intersection of Minnesota law on joint and several 
liability with the no-fault workers’ compensation scheme.”382 
The issue in the case concerned the impact of the 2003 
amendment of the Comparative Fault Act on the apportionment of 
fault in a case involving a contribution claim by a third party 
against an employer.383 Staab I would require the apportionment of 
fault to the employer, even if it were not a party to the case, and a 
finding that ELS is 50% or less at fault would mean that ELS could 
be held only severally liable.384 If more than 50% at fault, however, 
ELS would be jointly and severally liable.385 On the other hand, 
following the line of cases dealing with an employer’s contribution 
liability, it appears that the apportionment of fault among an 
employer and third party is not controlled by the Comparative 
Fault Act and is therefore not subject to the default rule of several 
liability in the Act.386 
In Lambertson v. Cincinnati Welding Corp.,387 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court arrived at a compromise that avoided the potential 
constitutional problems created by disallowing a claim for 
contribution by a third-party tortfeasor while allowing an at-fault 
 
 378.  Id. 
 379.  Id. at 969–70. 
 380.  Id. at 970.  
 381.  Id. at 978. 
 382.  Id. Procedurally, the court noted that there is “no basis” in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure “for granting partial summary judgment on a 
hypothetical question of this sort,” which required denying the motion, but 
because the parties briefed and argued the issue, the court saw “no reason to defer 
addressing an issue that the parties have indicated will be relevant to the 
resolution of the case.” Id. 
 383.  Id. at 978–79. 
 384.  See Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 80 (Minn. 2012).  
 385.  See id.  
 386.  See id. at 81 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
 387.  312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). 
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employer to receive reimbursement for workers’ compensation 
benefits paid to an injured employee.388 The court held that a third-
party tortfeasor had a right to contribution against an employer 
whose fault caused injury to an employee, but preserved the 
balance struck in the Workers’ Compensation Act by limiting the 
right of contribution to the employer’s percentage of fault or 
workers’ compensation, whichever is less.389 The solution was a 
practical one: 
While there is no common liability to the employee in 
tort, both the employer and the third party are 
nonetheless liable to the employee for his injuries; the 
employer through the fixed no-fault workers’ 
compensation system and the third party through the 
variable recovery available in a common law tort action. 
Contribution is a flexible, equitable remedy designed to 
accomplish a fair allocation of loss among parties. Such a 
remedy should be utilized to achieve fairness on 
particular facts, unfettered by outworn technical concepts 
like common liability.390 
Because contribution is an equitable remedy “unfettered by 
outworn technical concepts like common liability,”391 the 
Comparative Fault Act does not control the employer’s liability on 
a contribution claim, notwithstanding the absence of common law, 
common liability between an employer and third party tortfeasor.392 
Subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions continued to take 
that position.393 
In Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc.,394 the court held that the 
Comparative Fault Act does not affect the apportionment 
procedure set out in Johnson, and “that a third-party tortfeasor may 
recover contribution from a negligent employer under the 
principles of Lambertson and Johnson whether or not the employee, 
in a direct suit, would have been barred from recovery under the 
comparative-fault statute.”395 Hudson permitted contribution against 
the employer even though the employer’s fault was equal to the 
 
 388.  Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 689. 
 389.  Id. 
 390.  Id. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688. 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (2014).  
 393.  See Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982). 
 394.  Id. 
 395.  Id. at 158. 
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plaintiff’s (under the comparative negligence statute in existence at 
the time a plaintiff was barred from recovery if the plaintiff’s fault 
was equal to or greater than the fault of the person from whom 
recovery was sought).396 The court permitted a result that would 
have been precluded had the employer been a defendant subject to 
traditional tort liability.397 
In Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co.,398 decided three years later, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that “section 604.02[] does not 
govern an employer’s contribution or an offset to an employer’s 
subrogation claim,” and that an employer’s obligation is limited to 
its obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits, “even though 
the employer’s fault-based share of the damages would have been 
greater.”399 Following Hudson, the court concluded “that the 
statutory apportionment of damages” in the Comparative Fault Act 
“does not govern an employer’s contribution or an offset to an 
employer’s subrogation claim.”400 The court explained: 
We agree with U.S. Steel that the statutory apportionment 
of damages, section 604.02, does not govern an 
employer’s contribution or an offset to an employer’s 
subrogation claim. Clark and U.S. Steel are neither jointly 
liable nor jointly and severally liable to U.S. Steel’s 
employee. An employer’s obligation with respect to the 
employee’s damages is limited by his obligation for 
workers’ compensation benefits even though the 
employer’s fault-based share of the damages would have 
been greater. On the other hand, an employer’s 
subrogation against a more culpable third-party is denied 
to the extent of the employer’s proportionate share of the 
fault even though the employer was less at fault than the 
injured employee.401 
This strain of authority clearly acknowledges that while the 
structure of the Comparative Fault Act is used for purposes of 
apportioning fault, the Act does not limit the third party 
tortfeasor’s right of contribution against the employer.402 It also 
 
 396.  Id. at 157–58. 
 397.  Id. at 158. 
 398.  370 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 1985). 
 399.  Id. at 420–21. 
 400.  Id. at 420. 
 401.  Id. at 420–21 (citations omitted). 
 402.  Id. at 421. 
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clearly states that the third party and the employer are neither 
jointly nor severally liable to the injured employee.403 
When Lambertson was decided, the rule of joint and several 
liability had not yet been modified by the legislature, and the 
Workers’ Compensation Act was silent on the issue of contribution 
from the employer. In Johnson v. Raske Building Systems, Inc.,404 the 
court adopted a procedure for application of the Lambertson 
principle: 
The third-party tortfeasors . . . should pay the entire 
verdict . . . to the plaintiff. The employer should then 
contribute to the third-party tortfeasor an amount 
proportionate to its percentage of negligence, but not to 
exceed the amount of workers’ compensation benefits 
payable to the employee. . . . The employee . . . should 
then reimburse the employer pursuant to [section 
176.061, subdivision 6(c)].405 
The Johnson procedure requires the third party tortfeasor to 
pay the plaintiff the entire verdict.406 The employer then pays the 
third party on the contribution claim an amount equal to its 
workers’ compensation or fair share of the verdict.407 The employer 
is then reimbursed for its workers’ compensation payments from 
the plaintiff-employee’s tort recovery.408 The rough net effect is that 
the third party obtains contribution, capped by the employer’s 
workers’ compensation liability.409 The employer’s liability is limited 
to no more than its workers’ compensation liability.410 The plaintiff-
employee’s recovery is reduced by the workers’ compensation 
liability in order to avoid any double recovery.411 
 
 403.  Id. at 420. 
 404.  276 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979). 
 405.  Id.  
 406.  Id. 
 407.  Id. 
 408.  Id. 
 409.  Id. at 80. 
 410.  Id. 
 411.  See Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, 258 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Minn. 1977). 
In Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, the court held: 
So long as the employer is notified of negotiations leading to such a 
settlement so that it can appear or intervene to protect its interest and 
so long as the employee demonstrates that the settlement concerns 
only damages not recoverable under worker’s compensation, or 
allocates the settlement into recoverable and nonrecoverable claims, 
the employer cannot credit the nonrecoverable portion of the 
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In 2000, the legislature added subdivision 11 to section 
176.061 of the Workers’ Compensation Act that addresses the right 
of contribution: 
To the extent the employer has fault, separate from the 
fault of the injured employee to whom workers’ 
compensation benefits are payable, any nonemployer 
third party who is liable has a right of contribution against 
the employer in an amount proportional to the 
employer’s percentage of fault but not to exceed the net 
amount the employer recovered pursuant to subdivision 
6, paragraphs (b) and (c). The employer may avoid 
contribution exposure by affirmatively waiving, before 
selection of the jury, the right to recover workers’ 
compensation benefits paid and payable, thus removing 
compensation benefits from the damages payable by any 
third party. 
Procedurally, if the employer waives or settles the right to 
recover workers’ compensation benefits paid and payable, 
the employee or the employee’s dependents have the 
option to present all common law or wrongful death 
damages whether they are recoverable under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act or not. Following the verdict, 
the trial court will deduct any awarded damages that are 
duplicative of workers’ compensation benefits paid or 
payable.412 
Paragraph one incorporates Lambertson, but also provides that 
the employer may avoid contribution by the third party if, prior to 
jury selection, it waives the right to recover workers’ compensation 
benefits from the damages payable by a third party.413 Double 
recovery is still avoided because workers’ compensation benefits 
will be deducted from any awarded damages that are duplicative of 
the workers’ compensation benefits paid or payable to the plaintiff-
employee in the suit against the third party.414 
Notwithstanding the Minnesota Supreme Court’s statements 
that the Comparative Fault Act does not apply in determining 
whether an employer will be liable to a third party on a 
 
settlement against compensation payments. 
Id. at 894. 
 412.  MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 11 (2014). 
 413.  Id. 
 414.  Id. 
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contribution claim,415 the Comparative Fault Act does apply when 
the issue concerns the impact of allocation of fault to the employer 
on the right of the plaintiff-employee to recover against a third 
party. The court made that clear in Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc.416 
The plaintiff, employed by Bayliner Boats, was injured when a high-
speed drill with a circular saw blade slipped in her hands when the 
blade stuck in a hole she was drilling.417 The drill twisted violently, 
causing serious injuries to her wrist and arm.418 She sued Sioux 
Tools, the drill manufacturer. Sioux Tools impleaded Bayliner 
Boats, seeking contribution.419 The jury apportioned 35% of the 
fault to the plaintiff, 20% to Sioux Tools, and 45% to Bayliner 
Boats.420 Because the Comparative Fault Act requires individual 
comparisons of fault, and because the plaintiff’s percentage of fault 
was greater than Sioux Tools’ fault, the plaintiff was barred from 
recovery.421 
The plaintiff argued that the fault of her employer and Sioux 
Tools should be aggregated and that refusing to do so would 
extend the employer’s immunity from suit to the third party 
manufacturer, in effect allowing the third party to “borrow” some 
of the employer’s immunity.422 The court rejected that argument, 
noting that the plaintiff was not barred from recovery because of 
her employer’s immunity, but rather because a jury found her to be 
more negligent than the third-party manufacturer.423 The court 
found Bayliner’s status to be irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover when the plaintiff’s fault is greater 
than the fault of the person from whom recovery is sought.424 The 
court rejected as “pure speculation” the argument that the fault 
apportionment would have been different had the employer’s fault 
not been considered.425 
The court also pointed out that Bayliner’s fault would still have 
been submitted to the jury even had a contribution claim not been 
 
 415.  See Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 1985). 
 416.  Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1982). 
 417.  Id. at 796. 
 418.  Id.  
 419.  Id.  
 420.  Id. 
 421.  Id. at 799. 
 422.  Id. at 798. 
 423.  Id. 
 424.  Id. 
 425.  Id. 
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asserted.426 The court’s conclusion was based on Lines v. Ryan, a 
1978 decision in which the court held that the fault of a nonparty 
could be considered in apportioning fault.427 While Lines428 did not 
involve the liability of an employer, the court in that case relied on 
Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee,429 in which the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the fault of the plaintiff-
employee’s employer had to be considered in the fault allocation. 
Cambern specifically appears to apply the Comparative Fault Act in 
taking the position that the fault of the employer has to be 
considered in the apportionment of fault and that it will have 
consequences.430 
Cambern also has to be read in conjunction with the court’s 
opinion in Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc.431 However, Hudson was 
decided on the same day as Cambern, but without citing that case.432 
Hudson sustained serious injuries when the box of a dump truck 
descended on his shoulder.433 He brought suit against the 
manufacturer of the truck hoist, the dealer that supplied the truck 
chassis on which the dump truck box was mounted, and Snyder, 
the assembler of the truck.434 The truck hoist manufacturer 
impleaded Hudson’s employer, seeking contribution and 
indemnity.435 The jury found the plaintiff 20% at fault, the truck 
hoist manufacturer 25% at fault, the assembler 35% at fault, and 
the plaintiff’s employer 20% at fault.436 
The court held that an employer whose fault was equal to the 
fault of the plaintiff437 would still be subject to liability on a 
contribution claim by a third party, even though the employer 
would not have been liable to the employee had a direct action 
 
 426.  Id. 
 427.  Lines v. Ryan, 276 N.W.2d 896, 902 (1978). 
 428.  Id. 
 429.  Connar v. W. Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662–63 (Wis. 
1975). 
 430.  Cambern, 323 N.W.2d at 798. 
 431.  Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982). 
 432.  Id. 
 433.  Id. at 151. 
 434.  Id. 
 435.  Id. 
 436.  Id. at 154. 
 437.  The case arose in 1974, four years before the amendments to the 
comparative negligence statute turned it into a Comparative Fault Act. See id. at 
151. 
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been permitted against the employer.438 The court concluded that 
“[t]he comparative-fault statute does not affect the apportionment 
procedure set out in Johnson,”439 and that “a third-party tortfeasor 
may recover contribution from a negligent employer under the 
principles of Lambertson and Johnson whether or not the employee, 
in a direct suit, would have been barred from recovery under the 
comparative-fault statute.”440 
Justice Simonett, who wrote for the court in Cambern, dissented 
from that part of the majority’s opinion in Hudson because of the 
court’s creation of a special rule of pure comparative fault applied 
only in cases involving employers.441 He noted that the problem of 
the adjustment of liabilities and apportionment of loss where “the 
principles of a common-law, comparative fault action conflict with 
the counter policies of the workers’ compensation law [are] 
perplexing,” and that in Lambertson the court “relaxed the technical 
requirements for contribution” in order “to achieve a more 
equitable result,” but he disagreed that the court should “now rely 
on technicalities to relax comparative fault principles.”442 
After the 1978 amendment, an employer would be liable on a 
contribution claim even if the fault of the plaintiff-employee was 
greater than the fault of the employer.443 The employer’s fault is 
capped by its percentage of fault or its workers’ compensation 
liability, whichever is less.444 The key issue is whether the fault of the 
third party will be limited after the Staab decisions in light of 
Cambern and Hudson. The decision could go one of two ways. Either 
the court could hold that the Comparative Fault Act does not apply 
in the Lambertson setting, or it could hold that the Comparative 
Fault Act does apply to limit the liability of the third party. The 
cases from Lambertson through Hudson suggest the first. Cambern 
suggests the second. 
 
 438.  Id. at 157. 
 439.  Id. 
 440.  Id. at 158. 
 441.  Id. at 159 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 442.  Id. 
 443.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2014).  
 444.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 2 (2014); see also Staab II, 853 N.W.2d at 
720.  
76
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss4/6
6. Steenson_FF4 (1156-1236) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:25 AM 
1232 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1156 
The federal district court in Gaudreault445 took the second 
position, finding that Staab I is decisive on the issue, but without 
mentioning either Hudson or Cambern in its opinion: 
After Staab, it is beyond dispute that “a tortfeasor’s 
liability—whether joint, several, or both—arises and exists 
independently of the tortfeasor’s participation in a lawsuit 
and, therefore, is independent of the tortfeasor’s 
obligation to contribute to any judgment entered in such 
a lawsuit.” That Delta has no exposure in tort to 
Gaudreault by operation of the Workers’ Compensation 
Act is thus no barrier to the application of [section 
604.02, subdivision 1] to a special verdict in this case.446 
Applying the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis in Staab I, 
however, could well lead to the opposite conclusion. Nothing in 
the 2000 amendment that added subdivision 11 to section 176.061 
of the Workers’ Compensation Act changed the procedure the 
supreme court adopted in Johnson v. Raske Building Systems, Inc.447 
Using the Staab I approach to legislative history, when the 
legislature adopted several liability as the default rule in 2003,448 
replacing the “15% x 4” rule,449 which the court had held 
inapplicable in the employer/third party claim setting, it did so 
with knowledge of the supreme court’s position on the issue. Had 
the legislature intended to change that result, it could easily have 
done so. 
If there is no common law several liability because of the 
employer’s immunity from suit, the Staab I rationale does not apply. 
The court in Staab I relied on a conclusion that several liability and 
joint and several liability are determined at the time the tort is 
committed as a means of circumventing the problem created by the 
requirement in section 604.02, subdivision 1 that the statute applies 
“[w]hen two or more persons are severally liable.”450 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court held in Kempa, however, that there can be no joint 
and several liability between an employer and third party 
tortfeasor.451 
 
 445.  Gaudreault v. Elite Line Servs., LLC, 22 F. Supp. 3d 966 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 446.  Id. at 981 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 447.  276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979). 
 448.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (2002 & Supp. 2003). 
 449.  MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (1988). 
 450.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2012). 
 451.  Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co., 370 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 1985). 
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In Decker v. Brunkow, the plaintiff, an employee of Oak Ridge 
Homes, was injured when she slipped and fell on property owned 
by Brunkow.452 She brought suit against Brunkow, who then 
brought a third party action against Oak Ridge, claiming 
contribution or indemnity.453 A jury found Oak Ridge to be 95% at 
fault and Brunkow 5%.454 Decker moved to allocate the entire 
verdict of $125,020.93 to Brunkow.455 Brunkow argued that the 
then-existing limitation on damages of a person 15% or less at fault 
to no more than four times that percentage of fault applied.456 
The court of appeals rejected the argument.457 Following 
Lamberton and Kempa, the court noted that the lack of common 
liability precluded a finding of joint liability, which was a 
prerequisite for the application of the reallocation statute.458 
Neither party in the case argued that the legislature contemplated 
the conflict between workers’ compensation law and the 
contribution claim contemplated by Lambertson.459 The court of 
appeals concluded, as did the supreme court in Lambertson, that any 
change would have to be made by the legislature.460 
The 2000 amendment to the Workers’ Compensation Act does 
not appear to address the problem through its waiver and walk 
provision.461 The issue was not presented in Staab I. While the Staab 
I analysis of the 2003 amendment to the Comparative Fault Act can 
be applied in other cases where the fault of a nonparty is submitted 
to the trier of fact, it is by one line of supreme court decisions 
inapplicable in a case involving an employer. 
On the other hand, the supreme court took the position early 
on that the fault of the employer must be considered in any 
allocation of fault arising out of a workplace accident. It does have 
consequences, as Cambern illustrates, barring recovery where the 
fault of the plaintiff is greater than the fault of the third party. If it 
is considered for those purposes, it should arguably be considered 
 
 452.  557 N.W.2d 360, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 453.  Id. 
 454.  Id. 
 455.  Id. 
 456.  Id. at 362. 
 457.  Id. 
 458.  Id. 
 459.  Id. 
 460.  Id. 
 461.  MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 11 (2002).  
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in cases where the fault of the third party is 50% or less, but not via 
the route the supreme court took in Staab I. Rather, the analysis is 
the result of the application of section 604.01, subdivision 1 of the 
Comparative Fault Act as interpreted in Cambern. 
In summary, there are two choices in considering Staab’s 
impact on the third party claim. One, which follows the Kempa line 
of cases, recognizes that the Comparative Fault Act is inapplicable 
as a limitation on the fault of the employer, while at the same time 
using the Act’s structure for the apportionment of fault. The other 
is to assume that Staab overrides that line of decisions and applies 
the rule of several liability to employers if they are found to be 50% 
or less at fault. Cambern provides support for that proposition. If the 
court applied the Comparative Fault Act to preclude a finding of 
liability on the part of a third party manufacturer when its fault was 
less than the fault of the plaintiff-employer, it is a short step to 
apply the statute to limit the liability of the third party to its 
percentage of fault if it is 50% or less. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In Staab I 462 the Minnesota Supreme Court answered the 
important issue of the impact of the assignment of fault to a 
nonparty. Through a creative use of the tools of statutory 
construction the court reaffirmed the principle that the fault of a 
nonparty could be considered and that it would have 
consequences. The court held that the only defendant in the 
litigation, the Diocese of St. Cloud, would be liable for only the 
percentage of fault assigned to it. Because the diocese was found to 
be 50% at fault, it was liable for only 50% of the plaintiff’s damages, 
even though the other person (a party to the transaction leading to 
the injury) was not joined in the litigation. In the second Staab 
decision463 the court held that the Comparative Fault Act’s loss 
reallocation provision could not be utilized to increase the 
diocese’s liability beyond its 50% share of fault. Several liability 
means what it says. 
Together, then, the Staab decisions establish that the fault of a 
nonparty may be submitted to the trier of fact in allocating fault 
among the persons responsible for causing a plaintiff’s injuries, 
that a party found to be 50% or less at fault is only severally liable 
 
 462.  Staab I, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012).  
 463.  Staab II, 853 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2012). 
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(absent a joint and several liability exception) even if it is the only 
defendant in the suit, and that the loss reallocation statute cannot 
be used to allocate any uncollectible share of the obligation 
assigned to the nonparty to the severally liable party (absent a joint 
and several liability exception). 
The result in Staab I was certainly justifiable in terms of the 
court’s prior precedent, even absent the fiction that “liability” exists 
at the time of an accident, rather than judgment. Those cases 
lacked a clear policy rationale, however, one that was not supplied 
in Staab I. Staab II becomes easy in light of Staab I. Taking the 
statute as a whole, several liability means several liability, and the 
reallocation statute cannot be used to double down on the 
obligation of the severally liable party. That is the important point 
in Staab II. 
The issue of whose fault will be considered in the allocation of 
fault has been the subject of prior Minnesota cases, but even after 
Staab I there are open questions concerning whose fault will be 
considered. There are various cases where the issue has already 
arisen and others that will likely arise in subsequent cases. This 
short list includes cases where a party: 
1. Has been released from litigation pursuant to a 
Pierringer release; 
2. Is identified and is a party to related litigation; 
3. Is sufficiently identified to permit joinder; 
4. Is sufficiently identified but cannot be joined because it 
is not subject to service of process in Minnesota; 
5. Is not liable because a statute of limitations has run; 
6. Is a government employee protected from liability for 
negligence by reason of official immunity; or 
7. Is a person protected from liability for ordinary 
negligence by reason of a statutory protection. 
There are other issues remaining after the Staab decisions. 
One concerns the impact of the loss reallocation statute after Staab 
II. While the court barred its application to increase the liability of 
a severally liable party, the court by no means read the loss 
reallocation provision out of existence. There are various cases 
where reallocation will apply, but a condition precedent will be a 
finding that the party seeking to reallocate has paid more than his 
or her fair share of the judgment and seeks to reallocate an 
uncollectible share in part to other jointly and severally liable 
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parties or to the plaintiff, because of an inability to shift the loss 
through a contribution claim. 
There is also a question concerning the impact of the Staab 
decisions on the products liability reallocation provision in the 
Comparative Fault Act. The key issue is whether the fault of parties 
in the chain of manufacture and distribution will be limited to their 
percentages of fault if 50% or less at fault. Given the nature of the 
relationship of parties in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution, coupled with the impact of section 544.41, the Staab 
decisions should not in any way limit the liability of defendants in 
the chain of manufacture and distribution. 
The final issue concerns the impact of Staab I on third party 
claims against employers for contribution. The issue is whether the 
third party will be only severally liable if found to be 50% or less at 
fault. That turns on whether the Comparative Fault Act applies to 
those claims. The single decision on the issue, a federal district 
court opinion, applied Staab I and held that it did.464 The result in 
that case is sustainable, although its analytical path is questionable. 
As a final point, the gaps in the comparative negligence statute 
and the Comparative Fault Act over the years have been filled 
through a series of decisions necessitated by those gaps. The 
legislative march toward the adoption of several liability as the 
default rule has been a road that the legislature left rough because 
it used unclear and ambiguous language to express the key goal of 
achieving several liability.465 If several liability is the goal, the 
construction of the Comparative Fault Act in the Staab decisions 
achieved that goal. It is important to be discerning in assessing the 
impact of the decisions, however. 
 
 
 464.  Gaudreault v. Elite Line Servs., LLC, 22 F. Supp. 3d 966 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 465.  In King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492–93 (2015) (construing the 
Affordable Care Act), the Supreme Court noted the basic principle that in cases 
where the text of a statute is ambiguous, the “‘provision that may seem ambiguous 
in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because 
only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is 
compatible with the rest of the law.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
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